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QUEER TEENS AND LEGISLATIVE BULLIES:
THE CRUEL AND INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION
BEHIND HETEROSEXIST STATUTORY RAPE LAWS
Michael J. Higdon*
“Lesbian and gay youth are the most invisible and outcast
group of young people with whom you will come into contact” –
U.S. Department of Health1
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of commentators have drawn compelling parallels
between current laws that discriminate against homosexuals and
Jim Crow laws of the post-Civil War South.2 Both were designed
to brand a discrete class of Americans “as immoral, inferior, and
not deserving of society’s tolerance and protection.”3
At the
heart of Jim Crow laws was the concept of “separate but equal,”
which persisted until the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v.
Board of Education, where, largely because of the stigmatizing
impact that these laws had on African-American children, the
Court unanimously struck down racial segregation.4
Unfortunately, for the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
(LGBT) community, the equivalent of Jim Crow laws still exist
today. For example, in contrast to heterosexuals, homosexuals
cannot marry, cannot openly serve in the military, and, in some
*

Professor of Legal Writing at the William S. Boyd School of Law at the
University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I wish to thank Peter Bayer, Sylvia Lazos,
Ann McGinley and Rebecca Scharf for their invaluable assistance.
1
Paul Gibson, Gay and Lesbian Youth Suicide, in 3 U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services Youth Suicide Report 110-42 (1989), reprinted in
LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 163 (William B. Rubenstein, ed. 1993).
2
See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted
by “Unenforced” Sodomy Law, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 103114-15 (2000);
Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV.
1467 (2000); Richard A. Epstein, Caste and the Civil Rights Laws: From Jim
Crow to Same-Sex Marriages, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2456, 2468-76 (1994).
3
Leslie, supra note 2, at 114.
4
347 U.S. 483 (noting how school segregation is damaging to African
American children in that it “generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever
to be undone”); see also, infra notes 211-214 and accompanying text.
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instances, cannot even adopt. Although these prohibitions apply
equally to all homosexuals, some states have gone so far as to pass
legislation that is specifically directed at LGBT youth. Just like
the discrimination at issue in Brown, such state action is extremely
stigmatizing to LGBT youth, particularly in light of that fact that
such youth are not only politically powerless but are already
extremely marginalized within American society.5
In essence, these laws that target LGBT adolescents are antisodomy statutes. While the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas
invalidated such statutes as they pertain to consensual adult
relations,6 some states have retained such prohibitions as part of
their criminal statutes relating to statutory rape. Of course, this
retention, in and of itself, likely poses no Constitutional
impediment given that states have broad powers to protect
minors.7
However, recognizing the fact that sexual
experimentation is common among adolescents, most states have
created exceptions to their statutory rape laws for consensual
adolescent sexual activity involving an adolescent below the age of
consent when the sexual partner is another adolescent close in
age.8
These exceptions are commonly referred to as “Romeo and
Juliet” laws and, when triggered, generally result in either no
crime or a much reduced penalty.9 Unfortunately, some states
have decided that such an exception should apply only to
heterosexual activity and, thus, have written their Romeo and
Juliet laws to explicitly exclude adolescents who engage in
homosexual activity with someone below the age of consent.10
Accordingly, in those states, adolescent defendants who would be
protected by the Romeo and Juliet exception had their sexual act
been with someone of the opposite gender below the age of
consent, instead face the prospect of a felony conviction simply
because their sexual partner was the same gender as the defendant.
To see the inequities in punishment that result because of
discriminatory Romeo and Juliet laws, consider the case of
5

See, infra Section II.C.
539 U.S. 653 (2003).
7
See, Carey v. Population Services, Intern., 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977)
(noting that “in the area of sexual mores . . . the scope of permissible state
regulation is broader as to minors than as to adults”).
8
See, infra, note 181 and accompanying text.
9
See, infra, note 183 and accompanying text.
10
See, infra, note Section III.
6

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1097097

2/23/2008

Queer Teens and Legislative Bullies

Matthew Limon.11 In February of 2000, just after Matthew Limon
had just turned 18, Limon violated the state’s statutory rape law
when he engaged in oral sex with M.A.R., who was less than four
years younger than Limon.12 Had Limon fallen under the Kansas
Romeo and Juliet exception, the maximum sentence he would
have received would have been 15 months.13 Furthermore, he
would not have had to register as a convicted sex offender.14
However, Kansas’ Romeo and Juliet provision required that the
two actors be of the opposite gender.15 Solely as a result of that
requirement, Limon did not qualify for the Romeo and Juliet
exception given that both he and M.A.R. were male.16
Accordingly, Limon was convicted of a felony, sentenced to over
17 years in prison, subjected to 60 months post-release
supervision, and required to register as a sexual offender.17
It is the contention of this Article that such discriminatory
Romeo and Juliet provisions are unconstitutional violations of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Specifically, these statutes impose an extreme level of stigma on a
group of children, many of whom are already suffering daily from
harassment, violence, homelessness and a myriad of psychological
problems simply because they fail to conform to the heterosexual
norm.18 Accordingly, these discriminatory Romeo and Juliet laws
are a particularly invidious form of discrimination that cannot
satisfy even the lowest level of Constitutional review.19
Part II of this Article will first detail the nature of LGBT
adolescents, including the process by which sexual orientation
develops, the incidence of homosexual activity during
adolescence, and the problems that LGBT adolescence face as a
result of the societal stigma associated with homosexuality. Part
III will then look, in more detail, at how some state legislatures are
using their states’ statutory rape laws as a means of exacerbating
the stigma with which LGBT adolescents must already contend.
Finally, against that background, Part IV will chart Supreme Court
jurisprudence relating to the application of the Equal Protection
11

See State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005).
Id. at 24.
13
Id. at 25 (citing K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 21-4704).
14
Id. at 25 (citing K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 22-4902).
15
Id. at 24.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 25.
18
See, infra, Section II.C.
19
See, infra, Section IV.
12
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Clause on stigmatizing legislation and examine how, in light of
those cases, discriminatory Romeo and Juliet laws are
unconstitutional given the extremely stigmatizing impact they have
on LGBT adolescents.
II. HOMOSEXUAL ADOLESCENCE:
A PAINFUL AND PERILOUS JOURNEY
Few would disagree that adolescence is a difficult time for
everyone, regardless of sexual orientation. However, studies
reveal that, for LGBT youth, adolescence brings with it additional
challenges and problems as a result of the stigma that attaches to
individuals who fail to abide by gender and heterosexual norms.
As aptly stated in the book Youth and Sexualities: “[T]hose queers
who organize their sexual practices or gender performances
outside the range of heteronorms can be seen as recalcitrant
traitors to the cause, unwilling to make the appropriate sacrifices
for the sake of inclusion.”20
Indeed, LGBT youth face a whole host of difficulties in a
variety of settings simply as a result of their nonconformity.
However, to fully appreciate this level of stigma and the ensuing
harm it often produces, it is first necessary to understand the
development of nonconforming sexual identity among LGBT
youth as well as the resulting incidence of homosexual activity.
A. The Development of Sexual Identity
For those who believe that sexual identity21 is purely a product
of adulthood,22 “adolescent homosexuals” simply do not exist.23
20

Susan Talburt, Eric Rofes, & Mary Louise Rasmussen, Transforming
Discourses of Queer Youth and Educational Practices Surrounding Gender,
Sexuality, and Youth, in YOUTH AND SEXUALITIES: PLEASURE, SUBVERSION,
AND INSUBORDINATION IN AND OUT OF SCHOOLS 5 (Mary Louise Rasmussen,
Eric Rofes & Susan Talburt eds., 2004).
21
By way of terminology, psychologists define sexual identity as “an
enduring sense of oneself as a sexual being fitting into a culturally prescribed
category.” See, e.g., Ritch C. Savin-Williams & Richard G. Rodriguez, A
Developmental, Clinical Perspective on Lesbian, Gay Male, and Bisexual
Youths, in ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY 80 (Thomas P. Gullota, Gerald R. Adams &
Raymond Montemayor eds, 1993).
22
As one commentator has noted, there is a “false presumption that a
conclusive sexual identity cannot be formed until adulthood.” Joseph J.
Wardenski, A Minor Exception?: The Impact of Lawrence v. Texas on LGBT
Youth, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1363, 1375 (2005).
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As one commentator noted: “In this conceptual framework, there
is simply no place for a homosexual child or adolescent. There are
only children and adolescents with latent homosexual inclinations,
and adult homosexuals.”24 Or, more succinctly, “[a]ll youths are
considered innocent and straight until proven guilty and gay.”25
However, the reality is that homosexuals today are “coming
out” at much younger ages, often during puberty.26 Of course,
social scientists agree that it is unclear at exactly what point sexual
identity emerges27 and “[m]any gay and lesbian teenagers – or
those who will ultimately self-identify as such – tend to get
through adolescence without publicly adopting the label of ‘gay’
or ‘lesbian.’”28 Nonetheless, even for those individuals who may
not self-identify as homosexual until adulthood, the truth is that the
path to this ultimate “discovery”29 is one that begins long before
the “magic” age of eighteen.30
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that, although
sexual identity may become finalized until adulthood, many agree
that sexual orientation actually becomes fixed during childhood.
For example, in his book Sexual Science and the Law, Richard
Green notes that the “age at which sexual orientation emerges is
23

See, Youth Comm’n and City and County of San Francisco, San
Francisco Human Rights Comm’n, Public Hearing: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
Transgender, Queer and Questioning Youth 13 (1996) (testimony of Jesse
Costello-Good, San Francisco Youth Commission Co-Chair) (“The idea persists
that gay people jump into existence at age 18.”).
24
Teemu Ruskola, Minor Disregard: The Legal Construction of the
Fantasy that Gay and Lesbian Youth Do Not Exist, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
269, 281 (1996).
25
Savin-Williams & Rodriguez, supra note 21, at 79.
26
See, ELLEN C. PERRIN, M.D., SEXUAL ORIENTATION IN CHILD AND
ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 72 (2002) (“The age of self-identification as gay or
lesbian appears to be decreasing . . . Recent anecdotal accounts report children
as young as 11, 12, or 13 feeling certain of their homosexual orientation and
disclosing it to their parents.”).
27
Savin-Williams & Rodriguez, supra note 21, at 83 (“As clinicians and
scientists, we know relatively little about one of the most important
developments in the lives of lesbian, gay male, and bisexual youths: how they
come to the point of identifying themselves as gay persons? At what age did this
occur?”).
28
Wardenski, supra note 22, at 1373.
29
Of course, many question whether we can trust the statistics concerning
those adolescents who self-identify as gay given the stigma that may play a part
in suppressing an accurate count. See, infra note 79 and accompanying text.
30
Warkenski, supra note 22, at 1373 (“[T]he formation and realization of
sexual identity is a long-term process that, for many individuals, is only just
beginning during adolescence.”).
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still being debated, but most of the debate is about how early.”31
Green goes on to describe his own research which reveals that
many men who will ultimately come to identify as homosexual or
bisexual can often be identified by behaviors they exhibit in early
childhood.32 Furthermore, Green posits that not only is sexual
orientation established early in childhood, but that once established
the orientation is “essentially irreversible.”33
When focusing on the difficulties that adolescent homosexuals
face, however, the relevant inquiry becomes not at what age a
person’s sexual orientation becomes fixed, but the process that a
person goes through before ultimately accepting his/her identity as
a homosexual. After all, “people are not born with perceptions of
themselves as heterosexual, bisexual, or homosexual in relation to
sexual or romantic settings.”34 Instead, these perceptions come
about gradually and, in focusing on that process, social science
reveals that it is one characterized by various stages, each with its
own difficulties.
Richard Troiden, a noted social scientist who has written
extensively on the process by which homosexuals develop sexual
identity, has divided the process into four stages: Sensitization,
Identity Confusion, Identity Assumption and Commitment.35 The
last stage, commitment, is the stage where “the individual’s
homosexual identity is internalized and integrated.”36 However,
given that the focus of this Article is on adolescent homosexuality
and because the commitment stage does not generally occur until
adulthood, the remainder of Part III will focus on the first three
stages and the corresponding age at which each generally takes
place.37
31

RICHARD GREEN, SEXUAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW 53 (1992).
Id.
33
Id. at 83; see also, Martin Dannecker, Towards a Theory of
Homosexuality: Socio-Historical Perspectives, in BISEXUAL AND HOMOSEXUAL
IDENTITIES: CRITICAL CLINICAL ISSUES 6 (John P. De Cecco ed, 1984)
(theorizing that “sexual orientation is acquired in early childhood which
determines adult behavior”).
34
Richard R. Troiden, Homosexual Identity Development, 9 JOURNAL OF
ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 105, 105 (1988).
35
Id.; see also, RICHARD R. TROIDEN, GAY AND LESBIAN IDENTITY: A
SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1988); Richard R. Troiden, The Formation of
Homosexual Identities, 17 GAY AND LESBIAN YOUTH 43 (1989).
36
See PERRIN, supra note 26, at 76.
37
Despite the order in which these steps are laid out, it is important to note
that “[h]omosexual identity development is not a linear, step-by-step process . . .
. Instead, . . . [p]rogress through developmental stages occurs in a back-in-forth,
32
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1. Childhood – The Sensitization Stage
Many scientists agree that, for gays and lesbians, the process of
understanding and defining a sexual identity begins in early
childhood. Specifically, according to Troiden, the first step in this
process is a “sensitization” or “prehomosexual” stage that occurs
between the ages of six and twelve.38 During this stage, “gay and
lesbian individuals may experience a vague feeling of being
different from their peers without specifically seeing themselves as
sexually different”:39
When adult homosexuals are interviewed,
many (but not all) report that they felt “different”
from other children when they were young.
Frequently, when questioned more closely, it turns
out that this sense of “differentness” came from
the fact that they had play interests of the opposite
gender during childhood. Boys may find they are
less interested in sports than their peers and prefer
solitary activities such as reading and music; girls
may find that they are more independent or
athletic than other girls. All of this occurs
completely outside the realm of sexuality at this
age.40
As this quote makes clear, these feelings often emanate, not
from any sexual feelings, but simply from gender nonconformity.41
up-and-down fashion.” Troiden, supra note 34, at 105.
38
Troiden, supra note 35, at 50-53.
39
Susanne M. Stronski Huwiler & Gary Remafedi, Adolescent
Homosexuality, 33 REV. JURIDICA U. INTER. P. R. 151, 160 (1999); see also,
Savin-Williams & Rodriguez, supra note 21, at 85 (“One common experience
reported by lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men is that from an early age, usually
before adolescence, they felt different.”). However, only a minority of gays and
lesbians saw themselves as sexually different before age 12. See, Troiden, supra
note 34, at 106 (“Children who are ‘prehomosexuals’ rarely if ever wonder ‘Am
I a homosexual?,’ or believe that homosexuality has anything to do with them
personally.”).
40
FRANCIS MARK MONDIMORE, A NATURAL HISTORY OF HOMOSEXUALITY
163 (1996); see also, PERRIN, supra note 26, at 60 (gender nonconformity
during childhood, although not determinative, is a good predictor of
homosexuality).
41
See also, PERRIN, supra note 26, at 75 (“This sense of differentness arises
largely from their gender-neutral or gender-atypical interests and behaviors, not
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Of course, many children, including those who will ultimately
identify as heterosexual, experience feelings of being different.42
However, research proves that this feeling is much more common
among homosexuals. Specifically, research on adults reveals that,
among gays and lesbians, 75 to 85% report feelings of being
different during childhood, compared with only 10% of
heterosexuals.43 In another study, 72% of gay men reported
feeling “somewhat or very different” from male peers in contrast
to only 39% of heterosexual males who reported similar feelings.44
Indeed, homosexual males have described this feeling of not
fitting in as an “awareness of a normative standard of how boys
are ‘supposed to’ feel and act and a belief from an early age that
they violate this ideal.”45 Likewise, lesbian women attribute this
feeling to the fact that they were “more ‘masculine’ than other
girls, more interested in sports, and did not enjoy typical girls’
activities, such as hopscotch and playing house.”46 These feelings
are not that surprising given that “children are exquisitely sensitive
to gender roles at a very young age.”47 As psychiatrist Francis
Mark Mondimore points out, one need only visit a school
playground to see the gender differentiation that occurs among
children: “In a playground full of children under the age of ten or
so, boys will be observed to play with boys and girls with girls.
Research has confirmed this to be true across many cultures.”48
Children who challenge these gender roles often feel like
“outsiders, wanting but fearing to be let in.”49
because of same-sex attractions or sexual activities.”).
42
See, MONDIMORE, supra note 40, at 163 (“Some persons who as adults
consider themselves heterosexual recall also feeling ‘different’ from same-sex
peers and engaging in gender nonconforming play – and [vice versa]”; PERRIN,
supra note 26, at 60.
43
See, Savin-Williams & Rodriquez supra note 21, at 85.
44
See, MONDIMORE supra note 40, at 163.
45
PERRIN, supra note 26, at 59-60; see also, Paul Flowers & Katie Buston ,
”I Was Terrified Of Being Different”: Exploring Gay Men’s Accounts Of
Growing-Up In A Heterosexist Society, 24 J. OF ADOLESCENCE 51, 54 (2001)
(noting that the negativity that many gay men report having felt during
adolescence “stems from the surrounding social context that provides powerful
expectation of heterosexuality”).
46
PERRIN, supra note 26, at 75; However, it’s important to note that
“neither feelings of differentness nor childhood gender atypicality correlate as
strongly with same-sex orientations among women as they do among me.” Id.
at 60-61.
47
MONDIMORE, supra note 40, at 162.
48
Id.
49
Savin-Williams & Rodriquez, supra note 21, at 85.
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Furthermore, it is in this “playground” setting with its
corresponding emphasis on gender norms and the expectation of
gender conformity, that most people first encounter the labels of
sexual orientation. Indeed, as Mondimore notes, “children learn
the labels for sexual orientation several years before they are
capable of understanding the concept of sexual orientation.”50 Not
surprisingly, children generally first encounter these terms as terms
of derision: “Elementary school children can be heard using
words like sissy, tomboy, and even queer and faggot as terms of
contempt for each other years before they have mature sexual
feelings or become familiar with concepts of sexual orientation.”51
Finally, those who have reported experiencing these sensations
of “not fitting in” report that, although they were unable to identify
the origin or meaning, they knew that such these feelings were
very important.52
2. Late Childhood/Early Adolescence – Identity Confusion
As “prehomosexual” children get older, but generally some
time before age 1553, they begin to develop same-sex attractions,
and that sense of being different starts to “crystallize into a sense
of sexual difference.”54 As a result, for the first time in their lives,
many of these children begin to suspect that they might be
homosexual. Such a realization is often at odds with the child’s
previously assumed heterosexual identity.
The resulting
50

MONDIMORE, supra note 40, at 162.
Id. Mondimore notes that children typically associate such words with
“gender non-conforming behavior” as well as simply “being different and
unwanted.” Id. at 162-63.
52
See, Savin-Williams & Rodriquez, supra note 21, at 85; A. Damien
Martin, Learning to Hide: The Socialization of the Gay Adolescent, 10
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 52 (1982)
53
See, MONDIMORE, supra note 40, at 165; Eric M. Dubé & Ritch C. SavinWilliams, Sexual Identity Development Among Ethnic Sexual-Minority Male
Youths, 35 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 1389 (1999) (putting the age at 8-11
years-old);see also, PERRIN, supra note 26, at 76 (noting that the age has
dropped over the past few decades).
54
Adrian Coyle, Developing Gay and Lesbian Identity in Adolescence, in
TEENAGE SEXUALITY: HEALTH, RISK AND EDUCATION 168 (John Coleman &
Debi Roker eds, 1998). However, studies seem to indicate that women tend to
experience same-sex attractions later than men and, thus, begin to question their
sexual identities at later ages. See, e.g., Troiden, supra note 34, at 107 (“As a
general rule, gay males are aware of their same-sex attractions at earlier ages
than lesbians.”); PERRIN, supra note 26, at 61.
51
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dissonance leads to, what Troiden describes as, “identity
confusion.”55 However, this stage is a bit more complicated than
its name might imply. Indeed, this stage of development is not
only about the confusion that comes from this revelation
concerning sexual orientation, but also the resulting anxiety and
shame:56
The stigma surrounding homosexuality which
the individual internalized at a younger age adds
emotional overtones to this dilemma.
The
adolescent is confronted by the possibility that a
previously held self-image as a ‘normal’ person
may be incorrect and he or she may in fact be
terribly ‘abnormal,’ ‘perverted,’ ‘sinful,’ or any
number of other negative characterizations that
spring from internalized stigmatization of
homosexuality.57
In other words, these children are confronted with the troubling
suspicion that they might actually be one of those “dykes” or
“faggots” that they have frequently heard their peers speak of with
such contempt.58 Indeed, social condemnation of homosexuality
has much to do with this resulting identity confusion.59
Those adolescents who experience feelings of identity
confusion often deal with those feelings in one of five ways:
denial, repair, avoidance, redefinition, and/or acceptance.60 For
those who choose denial, they actively try and ignore all

55

Troiden, supra note 34, at 107.
MONDIMORE, supra note 40, at 166.
57
Id.
58
It is important to note here that not all children and adolescents who
experience same-sex attractions will ultimately self-identify as homosexual.
See, infra note 106 and accompanying text. Thus, the stigma resulting from
these attractions are likely to befall far not only homosexual children but
heterosexual children as well.
59
Troiden, supra note 34, at 107 (“Stigma creates guilt, a perceived need
for secrecy, and social isolation; it discourages adolescent lesbians and gay
males from discussing their emerging sexual desires or activities with peers or
families.”); Furthermore, this stage is especially difficult for males given the
rather rigid gender role to which society expects males to conform. See, F. G.
Bolton, Jr. & Ann E. MacEachron, Adolescent Male Sexuality: A Developmental
Perspective, 3 J. OF ADOLESCENT RESEARCH 259 (1988).
60
Troiden, supra note 34, at 108; see also, PERRIN, supra note 26, at 76-77.
56
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homosexual feelings and desires.61 As Mondimore describes,
“[t]here is a separation of the thinking and feeling components of
their psychological functioning, and the unacceptable feelings are
mentally rejected whenever they crop up.” 62 Of course, denial
offers little in the way of a solution and, furthermore, can result in
additional problems. Aside from the obvious self-esteem issues
that can easily result,63 denial may also “include promiscuous
heterosexual activity and include the risk of pregnancy.”64
Additionally, as Mondimore notes, “[e]scape into alcohol and drug
abuse may serve the dual purposes of distracting the individual
from unacceptable feelings and providing an excuse for having
them in the first place.”65
In contrast to denial, those who deal with homosexual feelings
with repair confront their homosexual feelings head on but, at the
same time, are actively trying to alter those feelings.66 A number
of religious and conservative organizations currently exist with the
mission of “curing” homosexuals who seek to change their
orientation.67 However, as many have pointed out, “there is no
evidence that these attempts to ‘cure’ homosexuality do anything
but increase confusion and guilt” 68 and can even lead to lasting
psychological damage. 69
Still other LGBT adolescents deal with identity confusion
using avoidance and simply ignore their feelings and what they
may mean in terms of sexual orientation.70 Additionally, teens
who exercise avoidance may also attempt to avoid activities that
61

Troiden, supra note 34, at 108 (“Lesbians and gay males who use denial
disavow the homosexual component to their feelings, fantasies, or activities.”).
62
MONDIMORE, supra note 40, at 167.
63
Flowers & Buston, supra note 45, at 52 (linking denial with low selfesteem).
64
PERRIN, supra note 26, at 76.
65
MONDIMORE, supra note 40, at 167.
66
Troiden, supra note 34, at 108 (“Repair involves vigorous attempts to
eradicate homosexual feelings and behaviors.”).
67
See, MONDIMORE, supra note 40, at 167-68; PERRIN, supra note 26, at 76.
68
PERRIN, supra note 26, at 76.
69
See generally, Terry S. Stein, A Critique of Approaches to Changing
Sexual Orientation, in TEXTBOOK OF HOMOSEXUALITY AND MENTAL HEALTH
525 (Robert P. Cabaj & Terry S. Stein eds, 1996); Douglas C. Haldeman, Sexual
Orientation Conversion Therapy: A Scientific Examination, in
HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 149 (John C.
Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich eds, 1991).
70
Troiden, supra note 34, at 108 (“Although avoidant women and men
recognize that their behavior, thoughts, or fantasies are homosexual, they shun
situations that conform these inclinations.”).
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might even be associated with homosexuality: “A boy may
abruptly quit taking music lessons and go out for the high school
baseball team; a girl may drop off the softball team to take up
dance.”71 A fourth approach to identity confusion is redefining,
where a young homosexual simply classifies her feelings as
temporary, experimental or somehow justified based on
circumstances.72 Finally, some teens “are coming to a successful
resolution of identity and finding acceptance.”73 Looking at the
acceptance approach to identity confusion, many posit that, based
on the increasingly visible gay and lesbian community, more and
more teens are able to deal with identity confusion using the
acceptance approach.
Of course, rarely are these different approaches mutually
exclusive. Instead, many teens who experience homosexual
feelings will engage in a number of these different approaches.74
However, a LGBT adolescent suffering from identity confusion
must accept, as a reality, her differences before she will be able to
move into the third stage of sexual identity development.75
3. Mid to Late Adolescence – Identity Assumption
Having worked through identity confusion, the next stage in an
adolescent’s development of sexual identity is that of “identity

71

MONDIMORE, supra note 40, at 167; Troiden actually identifies six ways
that LGBT teens might attempt to avoid their feelings of homosexuality.
Troiden, supra note 34, at 108. These include 1) inhibiting interests and
behaviors associated with homosexuality; 2) limiting exposure to the opposite
sex “to prevent others from learning about their relative lack of heterosexual
responsiveness”; 3) limiting their exposure to information about homosexuality;
4) adopting anti-homosexual attitudes and actions; 5) immersing themselves in
heterosexual settings and actions; and 6) engaging in escapism, often with the
assistance of drugs and alcohol. Id.
72
Id. (“Redefinition . . . involves redefining the behavior, feelings, or
context along more conventional lines.”); see also, MONDIMORE, supra note 40,
at 167.
73
PERRIN, supra note 26, at 77; see also, Troiden, supra note 34, at 109
(“With acceptance, men and women acknowledge that their behavior, feelings,
or fantasies my be homosexual and seek out additional sources of information
about homosexuality.”).
74
See, supra note 37 and accompanying text.
75
See MONDIMORE, supra note 40, at 168 (“Considerable psychological
energy must continue to be expended denying, avoiding, or redefining
homosexual thoughts and feelings (and sometimes behavior) to prevent
incorporating them into the individual’s identity.)”
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assumption.”76 As Troiden describes, “[t]he hallmarks of identity
assumption are self-definition as homosexual, identity tolerance
and acceptance, regular association with other homosexuals,
sexual experimentation, and exploration of the homosexual
subculture.”77 However, even at this point, sexual identity is still a
work-in-progress given that, during this stage, homosexual
adolescents would typically be characterized as more tolerant of
than actually accepting of their sexual identity.78
Scientists agree that it is somewhat difficult to accurately
gauge the age at which LGBT teens tend to self-identify given the
extreme stigma associated with homosexuality.79 However, what
is somewhat clearer is the age at which most LGBT adolescents
tend to reveal their sexual orientation to others, a process that is
frequently referred to as “coming-out.”80 Of course, this “comingout” process happens for different individuals at different times.81
76

See, Troiden 34, at 109.
Id.; see also, PERRIN, supra note 26, at 77 (“[t]his stage of adolescence
begins with self-definition as homosexual, tolerance and acceptance of this new
identity, regular association with other homosexuals and (usually) sexual
experimentation.”)
78
Troiden, supra note at 34, 109; see also, Vivienne C. Cass, Homosexual
Identity Formation: Testing a Theoretical Model, 20 J. OF SEX RESEARCH 143,
156 (1984): (“You feel sure you’re a homosexual and you put up with, or
tolerate this. You see yourself as homosexual for now but are not sure about
how you will be in the future.”)
79
See, Ruskola, supra note 24, at 282-83. Other factors which may prevent
self-identification include “a lack of support structures in addressing the social
and psychological challenges involved with coming out, and uncertainty about
what degree of weight to attach to internal emotional attractions and sexual
feelings.”
Wardenski, supra note 22, at 1373. In addition, one scholar
attributes the “tardiness of self-identification” to the “unavailability of the label
“gay adolescent.” Ruskola, supra, at 282.
Furthermore, within certain cultures this stigma may be especially great,
thus delaying the age at which many ethnic minorities identify as gay or lesbian.
See, Dubé & Savin-Williams, supra note 53, at 1390 (“The theoretical literature
suggests that ethnic-minority youths may experience delayed timing of identity
labeling and disclosure due to a variety of factors such as internalized
homophobia, perceptions of rejection, and availability of support resources.”);
see also, Caitlin C. Ryan & Donna Futterman, LESBIAN AND GAY YOUTH:
CARE AND COUNSELING 14-15 (1998) (noting that ethnic minorities may be less
likely to self-identify given that, “[f]or many ethnic groups, being lesbian or gay
may represent rejection of one’s ethnic heritage” as “[m]ost ethnic minorities
consider homosexuality to be a ‘Western’ or white phenomenon”).
80
See also, Huwiler & Remafedi, supra note 39, at 160 (“’Coming out’
refers to the process whereby gay and lesbian individuals come to terms with
their sexual orientation, integrate it within their lives, and begin disclosure.”)
81
See, MONDIMORE, supra note 40, at 172 (“Many individuals quickly and
77
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Studies reveal, however, that the age at which adolescents are
starting to self-identify as homosexual has gone done. For
example, studies in the 1970s and 80s found that the average age
of “coming-out” was somewhere in the early to mid-20s.82 In
contrast, more recent research has put that age somewhere in the
late teens.83 Furthermore, one study found that the average age of
self-identification as homosexual is 16.84 These statistics are
relevant given that, as psychologist Anthony R. D’Augelli points
out “[c]oming out to oneself usually leads to disclosure to
someone else.”85
For homosexual adolescents, the coming-out process can bring
with it some positive results. Importantly, the feelings of stigma
and discrimination lessen as these teens “perceive that they belong
to a world that includes others with similar histories and
concerns.”86 However, as many have noted, this process of coming
out is rarely smooth and frequently brings with it new problems.
Specifically, coming out can result in a number of painful
rejections, including the loss of friendships.87 Another more
painful rejection can come from parents: “Some parents are
unable to adopt a supportive attitude, and a substantial number of
adolescents are expelled or run away from home to escape
intolerable family conflict.”88
easily become settled in their sexual orientation identity and confidently start
communicating this identity to others immediately. For others the process is
slower and more difficult.”); Troiden, supra note 34, at 109.
82
See, e.g., Barry M. Dank, Coming Out in the Gay World, 34 PSYCHIATRY
180 (1971); Gary J. McDonald, Individual Differences in the Coming Out
Process for Gay Men: Implications for Theoretical Models, 8 J. OF
HOMOSEXUALITY 47 (1982).
83
See, e.g., Ritch C. Savin-Williams, GAY AND LESBIAN YOUTH:
EXPRESSIONS OF IDENTITY (1990); Gary Remafedi, Male Homosexuality: The
Adolescent’s Perspective, 79 PEDIATRICS 326 (1987).
84
Gilbert Herdt & Andrew Boxer, CHILDREN OF HORIZONS 181 (1993). As
noted earlier, however, it is difficult to get accurate statistics on this issue given
that stigma can retard self-identification. See, supra note 79 and accompanying
text.
85
Anthony R. D’Augelli, Developmental Implications of Victimization of
Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youths, in STIGMA AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION:
UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE AGAINST LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND BISEXUALS
191 (Gregory M. Herek ed., 1998).
86
PERRIN, supra note 26, at 77.
87
See Huwiler & Remafedi, supra note 39, at 160-61 (“Unfortunately,
many gay and lesbian youth experience painful rejection and loss of
heterosexual friendships.”).
88
Id. at 161.
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Finally, for LGBT adolescents who are unable to successfully
assume their sexual identity, the results can be quite debilitating.
As Dr. Ellen C. Perrin notes, such teens “may maintain an
internalized stigmatizing view of homosexuality, experience selfhatred and despair, and avoid homosexual activity.”89
B. Homosexual Activity During Adolescence
Although many might prefer to pretend otherwise,90 the reality
is that many teenagers do have sex with one another.91 In fact,
studies reveal that four out of five people have their first sexual
experience during adolescence.92 Furthermore, when looking at
the particular sexual practices of these adolescents, it is not
uncommon to find that many of their experiences are
homosexual.93 More specifically, in terms of men, “homosexual
89

PERRIN, supra note 26, at 77.
See, JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 16 (1997) (“Sex is easily attached to other
social concerns, especially those related to impurity and disorder, and it often
evokes highly irrational responses.”); JUDITH LEVINE, HARMFUL TO MINORS:
THE PERILS OF PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM SEX 93 (2002) (“The idea that sex
is normative─and, heaven forfend, positive─part of adolescent life is
unutterable in America’s public forum.”).
91
Committee on Adolescence, Homosexuality and Adolescence, 92
PEDIATRICS 631 (“During the adolescent years, many youths engage in sexual
experimentation.”); Dana M. Northcraft, A Nation Scared: Children, Sex, and
the Denial of Humanity, 12 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 483, 489 (2004)
(reviewing JUDITH LEVINE, HARMFUL TO MINORS: THE PERILS OF PROTECTING
CHILDREN FROM SEX (2002)) (“Minors’ premarital sexual experimentation, even
before puberty, is not a new phenomenon.”).
92
See, Susan S. Kuo, A Little Privacy, Please: Should We Punish Parents
for Teenage Sex, 89 KY. L.J. 135, 137 (2000). Furthermore, a 2003 study found
that 47 percent of all teens were sexually active. ROBERT L. MADDEX,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 344 (2006); see also,
Levine, supra note 90, 93 (“[A]round the globe, most people begin to engage in
sexual intercourse or its equivalent homosexual intimacies during their teen
years.”)
More specifically, in two independent surveys, 18 to 19 percent of female
respondents reported having had vaginal intercourse by age fifteen. EDWARD O.
LAUMANN, JOHN H. GAGNON, ROBERT T. MICHAEL & STUART MICHAELS, THE
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED
STATES 327 (2000). By age nineteen, the percentage rose to 71. Id.
Additionally, data reveals that more than 50 percent of Americans between the
ages of fifteen and nineteen have engaged in oral sex. MADDEX, supra at 344.
93
See, MONDIMORE, supra note 40, at 169 (“Homosexual contact during
adolescence as an expression of sexual exploring and defining is common.”).
90
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experimentation is a presumed commonality among young
adolescent males.”94 Although empirical support is limited, at least
one study found that, among sixteen to nineteen year olds, 6
percent of females and 17 percent of males had experienced at
least one homosexual encounter.95 Furthermore, the Kinsey
Report found that, between the onset of puberty and age twenty, 28
percent of boys and 17 percent of girls had had at least one
homosexual experience.96
If these percentages appear high, it is important to note that
homosexual activity between adolescents is not limited to those
teens who will eventually identify as gay or lesbian. In fact, the
majority of teens who engage in homosexual sex do not become
gay.97 For example, one study of both males and females found
that almost 12 percent reported some homosexual contact during
adolescence, yet only 6.7 percent experienced such contacts after
age 19.98 Another study found that, of adult males who have
engaged in homosexual activity, 42% of them reported that they
had done so only during adolescence.99 Furthermore, while
researchers estimate that only 2 to 4% of the male population
identify as homosexual,100 research has also revealed that, at the
same time, “two out of five men one passes on the street have had

94

Bolton & MacEachron, supra note 59, at 265 (pointing out that
“homosexual experimentation is a presumed commonality among young
adolescent males”). More specifically, “solitary/group masturbation, orgasm,
and same-sex sexual experiences have been well-known components in the
sexual histories of adolescent males.” Id. at 266.
95
Committee on Adolescence, supra note 91, at 631 (citing ROBERT C.
SORENSON, ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1973)).
96
See PERRIN, supra note 26, at 73. Incidentally, only 4% of the men in
Kinsey’s study practiced homosexuality exclusively from adolescents through
adulthood. Id.
97
See Gary Ross-Reynolds, Issues in Counseling the “Homosexual”
Adolescent, in PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS OF CHILDREN AND
ADOLESCENTS 55, 70 (Jeff Grimes ed., 1982) (“The majority of adolescents who
engage in homosexual behavior do not continue this practice into adulthood.”).
98
Robert E. Fay, Charles Turner & Albert D. Klassen, Prevalence and
Patterns of Same-Gender Contact Among Men, 243 SCIENCE 338 (1989).
99
See, David Weiss & Vern L. Bullough, Adolescent American Sex, in
ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY, AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 50 (Helmut Graupner &
Vern L. Bullough eds, 2004).
100
See, James Lock & Hans Steiner, Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Youth
Risks for Emotional, Physical, and Social Problems: Results From a
Community Based Survey, 38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY 297
(1999); Committee on Adolescence, supra note 91, at 631.
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orgasmic sex with men.”101
In looking then at what contributes to this practice of
homosexual experimentation among adolescents, most agree that
one of the biggest causes is merely teenage curiosity about sex.102
Indeed, few would disagree that sexual curiosity is not only a
normal part of adolescence, but also the driving force behind most
sexual acts between adolescents, both gay and straight.
Furthermore, social science also reveals that some adolescent
heterosexual males may engage in homosexual activity as a
demonstration of virility:
In a more general vein, solitary/group
masturbation, orgasm, and same-sex sexual
experiences have been well-known components in
the sexual histories of adolescent males. These
activities seemed to have provided not only sexual
release, but also served as a means of expressing
manhood and dominance in terms of demonstrating
the ease and rapidity of orgasm. Issues of intimacy
with another person generally have been absent.
Through this competitive masculinity the young
male may show himself to be the “real” man who is
infused with sexualized masculinity.103
Finally, for adolescents without access to the opposite gender,
homosexuality can also be situational. Thus, it is not uncommon
to find heterosexual adolescents engaging in homosexual activity
in such settings as “boarding schools, clubs, military cadet units,
[and] reformatories.”104 For individuals who fall into this
situational category, Dr. Francis Mondimore notes that
101

Richard D. Mohr, Gay Basics, in Sex, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 52
(Lori Gruen & George E. Panichas eds, 1997); see also, Dannecker, supra note
33, at 7 (“Large numbers of men engage in homosexual behavior for long
periods of time without acquiring the slightest traces of homosexuality.”).
102
See, MORRIS PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 206 (1951) (Much
homosexual activity is due to adolescent curiosity and sex experimentation)
103
Bolton & MacEachron, supra note 59, at 265.
104
Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Are Human Beings “By Nature” Bisexual?, 2
STUDIES IN GENDER & SEXUALITY 179, 202 (2001); see also, MORRIS
PLOSCOWE, supra note 102, at 206 (noting that homosexual activity during
adolescents is “normally carried on with schoolmates or friends of the same age,
and is a problem for boarding schools and camps confined to one sex”); Some
have referred to individuals in this category as “accidental homosexuals.”
Samuel G. Kling, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 97 (1965).
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“homosexual behavior is a kind of detour in their development of a
heterosexual identity.”105
Regardless of the impetus behind homosexual activity during
adolescence, most scientists agree that there is little to no
correlation between sexual orientation and adolescent sexual
experiences:
It is important to emphasize that the
development of a homosexual identity and the
decision to engage in same-sex intimacy are quite
independent processes. . . . For the majority of
individuals, sexual fantasies and feelings
increasingly center on males or on females during
adolescence, and assigning meaning to them in
terms of a sexual orientation identity can occur
independently of physical sexual activity.106
Indeed, “[t]here are heterosexuals who have experimented with
homosexuality, and there are heterosexuals who perform
homosexual acts with other heterosexuals.”107 In fact, studies
show that “[b]y early to middle adolescence, a large majority of
lesbians and gay males have experienced both heterosexual and
homosexual arousal and behavior.”108
Of course, some
adolescents will identify as homosexual even before engaging in
any sexual activity.109 Nonetheless, the important point is that for
the many teens, both heterosexual and homosexual, who do engage
105

MONDIMORE, supra note 40, at 169 (“Often, the homosexual activity is
accompanied by fantasies of heterosexual activity.”).
106
Id.; see also, Bolton & MacEachron, supra note 59, at 265 (“Experience
with homosexuality is not identical to self-identification as homosexual.”).
107
Christine Jax, Same-Sex Marriage – Why Not?, 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L.
461, 478 (1995).
108
Troiden, supra note 34, at 107; see also, Savin-Williams & Rodriguez,
supra note 21, at 81 (“Various forms of sexual activity may be played out
regardless of one’s attractions or impulses, perhaps out of curiosity, peer or
familial pressure, opportunities that emerge, or lustful desire. For example, the
majority of lesbians and gay men have engaged in heterosexual sex, usually
during their adolescence.”).
109
See, PERRIN, supra note 26, at 73 (“[A]dolescents who think they may
be gay or lesbian, like adolescents who are sure of a heterosexual orientation,
may not have any sexual experiences at all during adolescence.”); see also,
Savin-Williams & Rodriguez, supra note 21, at 81 see (“It is also apparent that
some lesbian and gay male youths come to the realization of a homosexual
sexual identity without the benefit of same-sex sexual activity.”).
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in sexual activity, it is not uncommon for this activity to involve a
person of the same gender.
C. The Impact of Societal Stigma on Adolescent Homosexuals
Regardless of whether an adolescent is actually engaging in
homosexual sex or is merely experiencing homosexual desires, the
stigma associated with homosexuality can be a very difficult thing
with which to contend. Furthermore, for those teens that will
eventually identify as homosexual, this stigma likely exists at
every stage of sexual identity development. As Troiden notes,
“[n]early all models view homosexual identity formation as taking
place against a backdrop of stigma, which heavily influences
identity development and personal adjustment.”110
Much of this stigma arises from societal homophobia, which is
generally defined as an irrational fear or hatred of
homosexuality.111 In terms of what causes homophobia, it “is
thought to emerge from a complex interplay of sociocultural and
historical factors, individual defenses, and experiential learning.
An important societal contributing factor is heterosexualism, the
widespread and often unconscious tendency to interpret human
experience in strictly heterosexual terms, thus ignoring and
invalidating homosexuality.”112 However, regardless of the cause,
the sad reality is that homophobia is not only widespread but, in
many instances, socially acceptable. As Gerald Unks states in his
book The Gay Teen: Educational Practice and Theory for
Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Adolescents:
Homosexuals are arguably the most hated group
of people in the United States. While other
minorities have gained a modicum of protection
and acceptance, homosexuals remain essentially
outside the pale. In their public lives, few
110

Troident, supra note 34, at 106.
Huwiler & Remafedi, supra note 39, at 162.
112
Id. at 163; see also, David McInnes, Melancholy and the Productive
Negotiations of Power in Sissy Boy Experience, in YOUTH AND SEXUALITIES:
PLEASURE, SUBVERSION, AND INSUBORDINATION IN AND OUT OF SCHOOLS,
supra note 20, at 227 (“To be called a ‘nancy,’ ‘poof,’ ‘fudge-tunneller,” among
others, is still an experience of vilification, but is also an experience, by its very
quality as hate speech, that calls forth and into view aspects of heteronormative
and masculine world still threatened by male-to-male sexual desire and sexual
practice.”).
111
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Americans any longer use words such as “nigger,”
“kike,” “gook,” or “wop.” Yet “faggot,” “fairy,”
“homo,” and “queer” are used by many without
hesitation. Picking on persons because of their
ethnicity, class, religion, gender, or race is
essentially taboo behavior, but adults and children
alike are given license to torment and harm people
because of their sexuality.113
This stigma and the resulting homophobia begin in childhood,
where, as noted earlier, children who do not conform to gender
norms quickly find themselves shunned by peers.114 However, the
stigma continues through adolescence and, in fact, even continues
into the stage of development when the individual fully accepts
and integrates his or her homosexuality into that person’s selfidentity.115 Nonetheless, where this stigma is particularly potent
and thus most likely to inflict the greatest amount of physical and
psychological damage is during adolescence. Indeed, as one
commentator aptly noted, “[g]ay and lesbian youth are constantly
exposed to environmental and internal stressors that stem from
homophobia.”116
It should come as little surprise that, for LGBT teens,
adolescence would be a particularly difficult time given that,
“[a]mong the troubling phenomena of adolescence is the
egocentric belief that they are ‘on stage,’ that people are watching
and potentially criticizing them.”117 Thus, “[f]or teenagers who
feel ‘different’ and marginalized, the intensity of this common and
normal worry is even more dramatic.”118 Accordingly, some have
equated the difficulty that homosexuals face when confronted with
societal stigma to that experienced by other groups that have been
113

Gerald Unks, “Thinking about the Gay Teen,” in THE GAY TEEN:
EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE AND THEORY FOR LESBIAN, GAY AND BISEXUAL
ADOLESCENTS 3 (Gerald Unks ed, 1995).
114
See, supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
115
See, Troiden, supra note 34, at 110 (“Once they adopt homosexual
identities, lesbians and gay males are confronted with the issue of stigma and its
management.”).
116
Huwiler & Remafedi, supra note 39, at 163; see also, Lynne Hillier &
Doreen Rosenthal, Special Issue on Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Youth, 24 J.
ADOLESCENCE 1, 3 (2001) (“The quality of life of many same sex attracted
young people is compromised by hostility, invisibility and alienation in their
daily lives.”).
117
PERRIN, supra note 26, at 72.
118
Id.
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subjected to oppression and discrimination: “The psychological
impact of incorporating negative and devaluing beliefs about one’s
gay identity may be just as devastating as being discriminated
against because one is a female, or African-American, Latino, or
Asian-American.”119
However, what makes adolescence particularly onerous for
LGBT teens is the profound sense of isolation with which they
must frequently contend. Specifically, unlike most ethnic and
racial minorities, gay and lesbians teens generally lack access to
others like them and, thus, lack one of the key coping mechanisms
that might help relieve the stress associated with homophobia and
stigma. Psychologists Paul Flowers and Katie Buston illustrate the
problem as follows:
[F]or many minority groups it is likely that social
support and affirmation of minority culture and
minority values are available within the home and
adjacent local communities. Similarly, it may be
that others sharing minority status are present and
identifiable in the school context and in other
social spaces, affording some protection from
minority stress.
Yet the situation for the
adolescent who is beginning to experience
homoerotic desires is clearly dissimilar.
Homophobic contexts make it difficult to be
public and open about these desires and it may not
be possible to identify others who are having
similar experiences. As adolescents get older they
may be able to access gay communities in their
immediate locality (this is more likely in large
urban centres) and minority stress may thus be
ameliorated. For many teenagers, however, there
may be barriers to such contact, including a lack
of awareness that such communities, or even other
people who feel as they do, exist. In these ways
heterosexism that is embedded in dominant
culture often leads to the absence of protective
buffers which could make young gay and lesbian
people less vulnerable to minority stress.120
119

Savin-Williams & Rodriquez, supra note 21, at 88.
Flowers and Buston, supra note 45, at 52. However, for those
adolescents who are both homosexual and a member of an ethnic minority, this
120
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Understanding this sense of isolation makes it that much easier
to appreciate the wide range of emotional and psychological
problems that these teens frequently experience. Although societal
stigma and homophobia exists in many different contexts, the
contexts in which it is most often visited upon gay and lesbian
teens is in their primary environments of home and school, both of
which result in their own fairly discrete set of problems. However,
beyond those two settings, it is also necessary to look at the
cumulative harms that can result from societal stigma in general.
1. Parental Abuse and Homelessness
For many gay and lesbian teens, homophobia often begins at
home.121 Sadly, aside from increasing a gay or lesbian teen’s
stress and sense of isolation, homophobia at home can also quite
frequently result in abuse and, in some cases, parental rejection.122
First, in terms of abuse, a study by the National Gay Task Force
found that 33% of gay and lesbian teens had experienced verbal
abuse from their families as a result of their sexual orientation.123
Unfortunately, for many the abuse does not end there. In fact, onethird of gay and lesbian teens have suffered physical violence at
the hands of a family member as a consequence of coming out or
having their orientation revealed.124 Thus, as one commentator put
it, “[f]or many gay youth, the closet is the only safe home.”125
sense of isolation can be even more extreme. See, e.g., PERRIN, supra note 26,
at 74 (“Lesbian and gay youth from ethnic/racial subcultures have to manage
more than one stigmatized identify, often without family support, creating
additional stress and isolation.”).
121
Wardenski, supra note 22, at 1377 (“LGBT youth often first confront
discrimination in their homes.”).
122
See, Sonia Renee Martin, A Child’s Right to be Gay: Addressing the
Emotional Maltreatment of Queer Youth, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 172-74 (1996).
123
Paul Gibson, Gay Male and Lesbian Youth Suicide, in U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S
TASK FORCE ON YOUTH SUICIDE 110, 127 (1989). Sadly, such verbal abuse is
not limited to those adolescents who have disclosed their sexual orientation. See,
Anthony D’Augelli, Arnold H. Grossman & Michael T. Starks, Parents’
Awareness of Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youths’ Sexual Orientation, 67 J.
MARRIAGE & FAMILY, 474, 481 (2005) (“Parents who suspect their children to
be LGB may make mor antigay comments, which may lead to learning that they
have an LGB child.”).
124
Wardenski, supra note 22, at 1378. Furthermore, “[a]buse rates against
LGBT youth are highest for those that are also racial minorities.” Id.
125
Ruskola, supra note 24, at 270. Of course, any teen, regardless of sexual
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Beyond physical and verbal abuse, homophobia can also lead
to parental rejection of LGBT teens. In fact, half of all gay and
lesbian youth experience some form of parental rejection simply
because of their sexual orientation.126 For many such teens, the
consequence of this rejection is homelessness.127 In fact, one
survey reports that 1 gay male out of every 4 is forced to leave
home once his parents learn of the child’s sexual orientation.128
Indeed, based on the number of gay and lesbian teens who are
evicted from their homes and those that run away as a result of
parental abuse,129 the percentage of homeless teens that are gay or
lesbian is extremely high.130 Although it is difficult to accurately
gauge the numbers, social service agencies estimate that between
25 and 35% of homeless youth in large urban centers are gay or
lesbian.131 However, in some areas the percentage is higher. For
example, in New York City, up to 50 percent of homeless youth
self-identify as gay, lesbian, bisexual or transgender.132
In addition to the trauma that results from merely being
orientation, may face abuse within the home. However, “studies clearly
demonstrate that the rate of psychological abuse among queer teens is higher
than that among heterosexual teens.” See, Renee Martin, supra note 122, at 169.
126
See, BENNETT L. SINGER & DAVID DESCHAMPS, GAY AND LESBIAN
STATS: A POCKET GUIDE OF FACTS AND FIGURES 77 (1994).
127
Wardenski, supra note 22, at 1377 (“Flowing from these problems,
LGBT youth are disproportionately likely to experience periods of
homelessness. . . .”).
128
Ruskola, supra note 24, at 270. Furthermore, many of these teens never
would have anticipated such a response from the parents: “We have seen several
instances where a young person confident of the love of his or her parents,
reveals his or her homosexuality and then ends up on the street.” Emery S.
Hetrick & A. Damien Martin, Developmental Issues and Their Resolution for
Gay and Lesbian Adolescents, 14 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 25, 35 (1987).
129
Renee Martin, supra note 122, at 176 (“Many abused queer youth escape
abuse by running away from home.”).
130
See, Huwiler & Remafedi, supra note 39 at 164 (“Among the 2 million
U.S. adolescents who are living on the streets, homosexual youth are clearly
overrepresented.”); Renee Martin, supra note 122, at 176 (“[Q]ueer youth
comprise a drastically disproportionate number of the homeless youth in this
country.”).
131
Gabe Kruks, Gay and Lesbian Homeless/Street Youth: Special Issues
and Concerns, 12 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 515 (1991).
132
See, Jenny Casciano, Colleen Sullivan, David Pumo & Cynthia Kern,
Client-Centered Advocacy on Behalf of At-Risk LGBT Youth, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 221, 231 (2001); see also, Renee Martin, supra note 122, at
176 (noting that the percentage of LGBT homeless adolescents in San
Francisco, Seattle and Los Angeles is estimated to be 50%, 40% and 30%,
respectively).
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homeless, gay and lesbian teens who are forced to live on the
streets are also much more susceptible to a variety of additional
problems. Indeed, as one commentator noted “[l]ife on the streets
exposes youth to drugs and sexual abuse and promotes illegal
conduct such as prostitution, drug dealing, and theft in order to
survive.”133 Specifically, one study found that up to 50% of gay
and bisexual male teens who are ejected from their homes support
themselves by engaging in prostitution;134 this, of course, typically
brings with it other problems. As Huwiler and Remafedi have
noted, “In association with substance abuse and high-risk
behavior, prostitution can be understood as just one element in the
vicious
cycle
of
stigmatization,
school
dropout,
runaway/throwaway, substance abuse and risky sexual
behavior.”135 Not surprisingly, the rate of HIV infection among
homeless gay teens is quite high.136
Obviously, not all homophobic households will result in
homelessness and its attendant risks. However, even if parental
abuse does not rise to the level of rejection, any psychological
abuse by a parent can be extremely devastating to LGBT teens.
Indeed, any child who has endured such abuse “has not only the
burden of his distress to bear, but that of being left with extremely
inadequate mental resources to cope with a degree of pain which
would overwhelm the most favorably brought up child.”137
133

Huwiler & Remafedi, supra note 39, at 165.
SINGER & DESCHAMPS, supra note 126, at 77; see also, Eli Coleman,
The Development of Male Prostitution Activity Among Gay and Bisexual
Adolescents, 17 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 137 (1989) (study finding that
approximately two-thirds of all adolescent male prostitutes are gay).
For many, prostitution is a replacement for the lack of support these teens
have received at home. See, Ritch C. Savin-Williams, Verbal and Physical
Abuse as Stressors in the Lives of Lesbian, Gay Male, and Bisexual Youths:
Associations with School Problems, Running Away, Substance Abuse,
Prostitution, and Suicide, 62 J. CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCH. 261, 266
(1994) (“Among their fellow prostitutes they found camaraderie and kinship
that substituted for the neglect or rejection they received from their biological
families and peers.”).
135
Huwiler & Remafedi, supra note 39, at 165. 10; see also, Lock &
Steiner, supra note 100, at 298 (“[A] study of homosexual and bisexual youth,
found an association between lower sexual risk-taking and higher self-esteem
suggesting that perception of self-worth (a possible corollary for level of
internalized homophobia) may contribute to behaviors of gay youth.”).
136
See, Huwiler & Remafedi, supra note 39, at 165; PERRIN, supra note 26,
at 90 (noting that “homeless youth are at particularly very high risk for HIV”).
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Rolene Szur, Emotional Abuse and Neglect, in CHILD ABUSE: THE
EDUCATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 121 (Peter Maher ed, 1987).
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However, for a gay and lesbian youth, such abuse can be even
more costly. In fact, some have characterized the resulting
consequences as “morbid.”138 Thus, it should come as little
surprise that, in at least one study, most gay and lesbian teens who
had attempted suicide cited family troubles as the biggest
contributing factor.139
2. School Bullying and Educational Consequences
As one commentator has aptly noted, “[h]igh school is one of
the most intensely and often anti-gay sites in our culture and a
central institution in the socialization of youth into
homophobia.”140 Of course, most youth spend about half their
waking hours at school.141 As a result, for gay and lesbian teens,
the school setting, which is frequently laced with extreme
homophobia,142 can be an incredibly traumatic environment.
Additionally, as a consequence of this abuse, “academic
underachievement, truancy, and dropout are prevalent among
homosexual youth.”143
In terms of school bullying, statistics reveal that almost 90% of
LGBT youth “sometimes or frequently hear homophobic remarks”
in school.144 However, what is more troubling is that over twothirds of that same population report having been verbally or
physically harassed on the basis of their sexual orientation.145
Another study found that, in general and among different
communities, 80% of homosexual youth have experienced verbal
abuse.146 In that same study, 43% of those surveyed had had items
thrown at them; 17% had been physical assaulted, and 10% had
been assaulted with a weapon.147 Regardless of the specific kind
138

Savin-Williams & Rodriquez, supra note 21, at 90.
Gary Remafedi, James A. Farrow & Robert W. Deisher, Risk Factors for
Attempted Suicide in Gay and Bisexual Youth, 87 PEDIATRICS 869, 874 (1991).
140
Ruskola, supra note 24, at 271.
141
Hillier & Rosenthal, supra note 116, at 3.
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Huwiler & Remafedi, supra note 39, at 164.
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of abuse, all of the abuse that the respondents reported was a direct
result of the sexual orientation of the victim.148
Furthermore, in looking at who is responsible for this bullying,
within the school setting, “peers, students, and roommates” are
usually responsible for this abuse.149 In addition, studies on
violence towards LGBT youth reveal that the typical assailant is
another teenager.150 Finally, and perhaps most disturbing, is the
fact that the “violent homophobes are not atypical, anti-social, selfdestructive, easily identifiable students”151
As one author
describes:
Perpetrators are not only predominately male and
white, but just as likely, or even more likely, to be
middle class; good in their classes; involved in
school and community activities, organizations and
athletics; popular, friendly, and sociable; enrolled in
college-prepatory programs in high school or
enrolled in college; and/or in the military . . . . 152
However, regardless of the demographics associated with most
teenage assailants, it would be a mistake to say that, within the
school setting, peers are the sole source of homophobia and abuse
directed toward LGBT youth. Instead, school officials and
administrators must frequently share much of that responsibility.
As an initial matter, many administrators simply refuse to
acknowledge the existence of gay teens.153 As a result, teen bullies
148

Id.
Anthony R. D’Augelli, Lesbians’ and Gay Men’s Experiences of
Discrimination and Harassment in a University Community, 17 AM. J.
COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 317 (1989); see also, GARY DAVID COMSTOCK,
VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 58 (1991) (following unknown
assailants, “[f]ellow students are the next most frequently reported
perpetrators”).
150
Elvia R. Arriola, The Penalties for Puppy Love: Institutionalized
Violence Against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered Youth, 1 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 429, 450 (1998). Arriola notes that “[t]he motivation for
antigay violence is male insecurity over one’s masculinity and the fear of peer
rejection for not being sufficiently masculine.” Id.
151
Ruskola, supra note 24, at 310.
152
COMSTOCK, supra note 149, at 106.
153
Ruskola, supra note 24, at 303-04 (“[A]dministrators, teachers and other
professional helpers are hellbent on not seeing gay kids and not acknowledging
their abuse, whether subtle or brutal.”).
As one school administrator has stated, “I’ve been a guidance counselor at
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often “act with impunity in schools that do nothing to curb teens
from calling other teens ‘fags,’ ‘homos,’ and ‘lezzies’ because they
dress and/or behave differently from other kids.”154 However,
LGBT youth sometimes face more than mere neglect at the hands
of school administrators. As one commentator noted, “[i]n many
schools it is simply too ‘dangerous mentally and physically to
come out,’ especially since school administrators and teachers
typically not only ‘refuse to protect gay youth from peer violence’
but themselves ‘harass, misinform, and unfairly punish gay
students.’” 155 In fact, one study found that 55 to 72% of gay and
lesbian college students had reported being the victims of violence.
While 64 % of the perpetrators were peers, 23% were faculty of
staff.156
All of these statistics and findings greatly undermine the
popular notion that school “is one place where all young people
will be safe.”157 Instead, as a result of the homophobia and abuse
that exist in many schools, many mental health experts have gone
so far as to label “the high school environment as the single
greatest source of negativity for LGBT youth.”158
3. Societal Stigma, Psychological Harm and Suicide
In addition to parental abuse, homelessness and school
this school for more than twenty years, and I don’t ever recall a student coming
to me and telling me that he or she was a homosexual. I don’t think we have
any gay kids here.” Robert Parlin, We Don’t Have a Problem Here, in ONE
TEACHER IN 10: GAY AND LESBIAN EDUCATORS TELL THEIR STORIES 219
(Kevin Jennings ed., 1994).
154
Arriola, supra note 150, at 447-48; see also, Ruskola, supra note 24, at
311 (“While teachers typically do not beat up gay and lesbian students, they
almost invariably let homophobic acts by other go unchallenged and often
engage in them themselves.”); Linda L. Morrison & Jeff L’Heureux, Suicide
and Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual Youth: Implications for Clinicians, 24 J.
ADOLESCENCE 39, 43 (2001) (“An overwhelming majority (97%) of GLB youth
report hearing homophobic remarks within their immediate school environment,
and some of these remarks are made in front of school personnel that do nothing
to challenge the peers’ anti-gay attitudes.”).
155
Ruskola, supra note 24, at 271.
156
See, PERRIN, supra note 26, at 86. These statistics are not that surprising
given that, in a 1991 study of school counselors, two-thirds expressed negative
attitudes about gays and lesbians.
See, James T. Sears, Educators,
Homosexuality, and Homosexual Students: Are Personal Feelings Related to
Professional Beliefs?, 3-4 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 29 (1991).
157
Hillier & Rosenthal, supra note 116, at 3.
158
See Arriola, supra note 150, at 448.
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bullying, the compound effect of the stigma and homophobia that
many LGBT youth encounter from society in general can also
result in serious harm which, all too frequently, prove deadly.
Of course, much of this harm may be attributed to anti-gay
violence. As Dr. Ellen C. Perrin explains:
[For LGBT adolescents, the threat of violence]
reinforces their sense of vulnerability and isolation,
discourages them from “coming out,” and may
restrict their educational and career aspirations.
Anxiety, depression, sleep disorders, substance
abuse, and frank post-traumatic stress disorder may
follow the experience or witnessing of anti-gay
violence. Lesbian and gay youth may blame
themselves for the violence, further exacerbating
the
destructive
effects
of
internalized
159
homophobia.
However, aside from actual violence, even the stigma of not
conforming to heterosexual norms can be quite a catalyst for
psychological harm. As one commentator noted, “[p]eer pressure
and harassment become a primary source of emotional stress that
produces alienated, isolated, and depressed LGBT teenagers.”160
Indeed, a number of studies indicate the relatively high prevalence
of anxiety and mood disorders that exists among homosexual
adults.161 Furthermore, such depression and anxiety is also quite
common among LGBT adolescents.162
For many of these adolescents, these psychological conditions
prove fatal. In fact, one of the oft-cited statistics concerning
LGBT youth is that they are two to three times more likely than
heterosexual youth to commit suicide. 163 Indeed, of the various
159

PERRIN, supra note 26, at 86-87.
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See, e.g., Susan D. Cochran & Vickie M. Mays, Relation Between
Psychiatric Syndromes and Behaviorally Defined Sexual Orientation in a
Sample of the U.S. Population, 151 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 516 (2000); Theo G.
Standfort, Ron de Graaf, Rob V. Bijl, & Paul Schnabel, Same Sex Sexual
Behavior and Psychiatric Disorders, 58 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 85
(2001).
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PERRIN, supra note 26, at 88 (“Lesbian and gay youth also often
experience depression and anxiety as they come to recognize their
homosexuality and its implications.”).
163
Lock & Steiner, supra note 100, at 297.
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studies that have looked at this issue, most found that between 30
to 50% of LGBT youth have attempted suicide, generally within
the past year and with several attempts.164 Furthermore, a 1989
report by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
found that, among all adolescent suicides, 30% were committed by
LGBT youth.165 Although alarming, these findings are consistent
with the sociological theory of suicide, which posits that “one of
the main reasons people kill themselves is a lack of integration into
the dominant culture.”166 As one teen said of his coming out
process, “I found myself staring at pills or a knife on more than
one occasion as I came out, and nearly succeeded in destroying
myself. I vividly remember the long hours of glaring at the mirror,
trying to decide if the image I saw was worth saving.”167
Furthermore, suicidal tendencies among LGBT youth are
particularly hard to combat given that studies find that, like many
other Americans, a large number of psychologists and social
workers hold homophobic and heterosexist views.168 Furthermore,
many such health professionals simply lack the required
knowledge to deal with LGBT youth. As one psychologist notes:
[I]n mental health care providers, there is a
demonstrated lack of knowledge about GLB [Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual] issues and life-styles,
differential assessment and treatment of clients
based on sexual orientation, a lack of awareness of
oppression as it relates to GLB clients, and the
pathologizing and denigration of GLB person
simply because of their sexual orientation.169
Finally, the rate of suicide among LGBT youth is further
compounded by the fact that many who are at risk are unlikely to
164

See, Ritch C. Savin-Williams, A Critique of Research on SexualMinority Youths, 24 J. ADOLESCENCE 5, 9 2001; see also, Huwiler & Remafedi,
supra note 39, at 163 (“[R]ates of attempted suicide among gay and lesbian
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See, Paul Gibson, Gay and Lesbian Youth Suicide, in 3 U.S.
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even seek help. As Pediatrician Gary Remafedi notes, “youth that
are at the greatest risk for suicide are the ones who are the least
likely to reveal their sexual orientation to anyone.”170 According
to Dr. Remafedi, “[s]uicide may be the way of being sure that no
one ever knows.”171
III. AGE OF CONSENT, STATUTORY RAPE LAW,
AND “ROMEO AND JULIET” EXCEPTIONS
As noted earlier, sexual activity among all adolescents,
whether homosexual or heterosexual, is relatively common. 172
Furthermore, few would deny that all teens, regardless of whether
they are acting upon them, experience sexual desires.
Accordingly, given these adolescent propensities as well as the
understanding that most adolescents lack full emotional, mental
and physical maturity, state legislatures are rightly concerned with
protecting teens from “unequal, manipulative, or predatory
relationships.”173 One of the primary ways in which legislatures
attempt to accomplish this goal is through statutory rape laws.
In essence, statutory rape laws criminalize sexual activity with
a child who is below the statutorily defined age of consent.174
Thus, age of consent laws, which vary by state, lay out the
minimum age at which a person can legally consent to engage in a
sexual act.175 As a result, in most instances,176 engaging in a
sexual act with someone below the age of consent is a criminal act,
given that the child was incapable of legally consenting.177 As one
170

Chris Bull, Suicidal Tendencies: Is Anguish over Sexual Orientation
Causing Gay and Lesbian Teens to Kill Themselves?, THE ADVOCATE, Apr. 5,
1994, at 38.
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Id.
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See, supra Section II.B.
173
CAROLYN E. COCCA, JAILBAIT: THE POLITICS OF STATUTORY RAPE
LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2004).
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MADDEX, supra note 92, at 274-75.
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Id. at 275; see also, Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict
Liability, and the Public Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 334
(2003) (“At its most basic, statutory rape is the carnal knowledge of a person
who is deemed underage as prescribed by statute and who is therefore presumed
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One notable exception is when the the two parties are married. See
generally, Kelly C. Connerton, The Resurgence of the Marital Rape Exemption:
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(1997).
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commentator states: “The law conceives as the younger partner as
categorically incompetent to say either yes or no to sex. Because
she is by definition powerless both personally and legally to resist
or to voluntarily relinquish her ‘virtue,’ the state, which sees its
interest in guarding that virtue, resists for her.”178 In most states,
the offense of statutory rape is a felony.
At one point, most statutory rape laws criminalized, at the
felony level, all sexual activity with a person under the age of
consent regardless of the age of the “perpetrator.”179 Thus, “if the
male were the same age as the female, or even younger than the
female, he would still be prosecuted for the crime.”180 However,
recognizing that sexual experimentation with peers is relatively
common during adolescence, many states today have enacted,
what are referred to as, “Romeo and Juliet” laws, which provide
for either a mitigated penalty or complete exculpation when both
actors are close in years yet one party is below the age of
consent.181 As Carolyn E. Cocca explains in here book Jailbait:
The Politics of Statutory Rape Laws in the United States:
[Romeo and Juliet laws] mandate that the
perpetrator be a certain number of years older than
the victim; some require that the perpetrator be at
least of a certain age, such as 18. A law that
formerly read, “It is a felony for any person to
commit an act of sexual penetration with any person
under the age of 16,” would be changed to, “It is a
felony for any person to commit an act of sexual
penetration with any person under the age of 16,
178

Levine, supra note 90, at 71. Interestingly enough, the original impetus
behind statutory rape laws was the property interest that fathers had in their
daughter’s chastity. See, COCCA, supra note 173, at 11 (“The idea behind such
laws at the time was less about the ability or lack thereof to consent to such
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Limon v. Kansas in Light of Lawrence v. Texas, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 359,
361 (2004). This change in the law was largely the result of feminist lobbying
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provided that the actor is at least four years older
than the victim.”
An age-span effectively
decriminalizes sexual activity between similar-aged
teens at the felony level.182
Of course, this is not to suggest that all states freely permit sexual
acts between older adolescents and those below the age of consent.
Instead, in most states, such acts are still criminalized; however, at
most, the perpetrator will merely be guilty of a misdemeanor and
not a felony.183 Furthermore, in most states, a defendant who falls
under the ambit of the Romeo and Juliet exception is not required
to register as a convicted sex offender as is required of those who
commit statutory rape and do not qualify for the exception.184
Now, in looking at the various incarnations of Romeo and
Juliet laws as they exist in different states, most of these laws are
applicable to both heterosexual and homosexual couplings. In
other words, in those states, a defendant who engages in a sexual
act with someone below the age of consent will qualify for the
exception regardless of whether the two actors are of the same or
opposite gender. However, three states follow a much different
approach. These states are Texas, Alabama, and California.
1. Texas
Under the Texas statute entitled “Indecency with a Child,” a
person is guilty of statutory rape if that person “engages in sexual
contact” with “a child younger than 17 years and not the person's
spouse, whether the child is of the same or opposite sex.”185
Anyone who violates this provision is guilty of “a felony of the
second degree.”186 The penalty for such a felony is imprisonment
for at least two years and no more than twenty.187 In addition,
anyone convicted can be fined up to $10,000.188 Finally, those
guilty of violating the Texas statute are required by state law to
register as a convicted sex offender.189
182
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184
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However, this same statute contains a “Romeo and Juliet”
exception, which states that “[i]t is an affirmative defense to
prosecution under this section that the actor . . . was not more than
three years older than the victim and of the opposite sex.”190 Thus,
under this statute, an eighteen year-old male who has consensual
sex with a sixteen year-old would be guilty of a felony if the
sixteen year-old were male but no crime whatsoever if the sixteen
year-old were female.
2. Alabama
In Alabama, a person commits the crime of rape in the second
degree if “[b]eing 16 years old or older, he or she engages in
sexual intercourse with a member of the opposite sex less than 16
and more than 12 years old.”191 Alabama law provides the
following definition for “sexual intercourse”: “Such term has its
ordinary meaning and occurs upon any penetration, however
slight; emission is not required.”192 Similarly, a person is guilty of
sodomy in the second degree if “[h]e, being 16 years old or older,
engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person less than
16 and more than 12 years old.”193 The legislature has defined
“deviate sexual intercourse” as “[a]ny act of sexual gratification
between persons not married to each other involving the sex
organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another.”194 Both
crimes are considered class B felonies, the commission of which
requires at least a two year and up to a twenty year sentence.195 In
addition, anyone convicted may be fined up to $30,000.196 Finally,
state law requires any defendant convicted of either crime to
register as a sex offender.197
conviction of statutory rape can petition “for an order exempting the person
from registration.” See, Id. at 62.301. However, the court is only required to
grant such a petition if proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such an
exemption would not “threaten public safety.” Id. at 62.301 (d)(1). Not only
does this rather loose standard provide judges with quite a bit of flexibility in
deciding whether to grant such a petition, but teens who engaged in the exact
same conduct but with someone of the opposite sex are automatically exempt.
190
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(b).
191
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-62 (1975).
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ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(1) (1975).
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ALA. CODE § 13A-6-64 (1975).
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However, Alabama law provides an affirmative defense for the
crime of rape in the second degree. Specifically, the statute
provides that a defendant is not liable unless “the actor is at least
two years older than the member of the opposite sex.”198 No such
exception exists for the statute governing sodomy in the second
degree.
Accordingly, given Alabama’s definition of “sexual
intercourse” and “sodomy,” all sexual acts between same sex
adolescents would be governed by the sodomy statute. Thus,
although the Alabama statutes are not as explicit as the Texas’
statutes in limiting the Romeo and Juliet exception to heterosexual
activity, the rigid definitions of “intercourse” versus “sodomy” in
the Alabama scheme, along with the lack of any Romeo and Juliet
exception for the latter, essentially operates the same as the Texas
statute, imposing a much a harsher penalty on adolescents who
engage in homosexual acts than those who engage in heterosexual
acts.
3. California
California, like Alabama, also distinguishes between sexual
intercourse and sodomy. Thus, in California, “[a]ny person who
engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who
is not more than three years older or three years younger than the
perpetrator, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”199 This is a reduced
penalty given that if there age difference were more than three year
the perpetrator could face a felony conviction.200 In contrast,
however, the state sodomy law simply provides that “any person
who participates in an act of sodomy with another person who is
under 18 years of age shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison, or in a county jail for not more than one year.”201
Unlike the penalties relating to sexual intercourse with a minor,
this penalty for sodomy attaches regardless of whether the two
actors are close in age. Furthermore, in contrast to Alabama’s
more general definition, California defines sodomy as “sexual
conduct consisting of contact between the penis of one person and
the anus of another person.”202
198
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Finally, those convicted under the sodomy statute are required
to register as sex offenders “for the rest of his or her life while
residing in California, or while attending school or working in
California.”203 In contrast, those convicted of sexual intercourse
need only register “if the court finds at the time of conviction or
sentencing that the person committed the offense as a result of
sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification.”204
IV. DISCRIMINATORY “ROMEO AND JULIET” EXCEPTIONS DENY
ADOLESCENT HOMOSEXUALS THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
As outlined in Section II, within American culture and society,
GLBT adolescents are an extremely stigmatized and bullied
group.205 Again, for these teens, much of that stigma arises and is
perpetuated within the home and school.206 Of course, sociologists
have noted that stigma can arise from a number of sources,
including, in addition to school and home, religion and the
media.207
Furthermore, as many commentators have noted, the law is
also one of the forces behind the social construction of stigma.208
As Professor Thomas Healy has described: “[L]aw not only
reflects social norms, but also helps shape social power and norms
by prefiguring preferences, prejudices and interests. Similarly, law
creates and contributes to stigma. When a social understanding
develops that a particular trait is deeply discrediting, law often
crystallizes and reinforces that understanding.”209
To see this principle in play, one need only consider the states
discussed in Section III, infra, that have added discriminatory
Romeo and Juliet provisions to their statutory rape laws. In so
doing, those states have not only contributed to the stigma felt by
203
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LGBT adolescents but have added a legal stamp of approval to this
discrimination and stigma. As detailed in this Section, these
statutes are not only stigmatizing and cruel but, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, unconstitutional as well.
A. Stigma, Invidious Discrimination and
The Equal Protection Clause: An Overview
“The concept of stigma is at the heart of equal protection
analysis.”210 Nowhere has the Supreme Court been more explicit
on this point than in the case of Brown v. Board of Education.211
In Brown, the court was presented with the following question:
“Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis
of race, even though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’
factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of
equal educational opportunities?”212 In response, the Court found
that racial segregation in public schools was a violation of equal
protection because “[t]o separate [African American children]
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of
their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone.”213 In support of its holding and
rationale, the Court relied on the earlier case of Sweatt v. Painter,
which set forth the following observations about the Equal
Protection Clause:
The words of the amendment, it is true, are
prohibitory, but they contain a necessary
implication of a positive immunity, or right, most
valuable to the colored race,-the right to exemption
from unfriendly legislation against them
distinctively as colored,-exemption from legal
discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society,
lessening the security of their enjoyment of the
rights which others enjoy, and discriminations
which are steps towards reducing them to the

210
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condition of a subject race.214
Of course, Brown dealt with racial discrimination, which is
subject to strict scrutiny, the most searching form of review that a
federal court will apply to an alleged violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.215 Nonetheless, it is important to note that the
court has never confined its consideration of stigmatizing harm to
cases involving strict scrutiny. In fact, the court has looked at
stigma, and invalidated laws on that basis, even when applying
rational basis, the least searching form of judicial review under the
Equal Protection Clause.216
However, the rational basis I refer to is not the traditional form
of rational basis, which allows all governmental action so long as
“the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.”217 As the Court has further explained:
Whether embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment or inferred from the Fifth, equal
protection is not a license for courts to judge the
wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In
areas of social and economic policy, a statutory
classification that neither proceeds along suspect
lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights
must be upheld against equal protection challenge if
there is any conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the classification.218
Looking at this language, it would be difficult to imagine a law
214

Id. at 492 (quoting, Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08
(1880)).
215
See, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982):
“[W]e have treated as presumptively invidious those classifications that
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‘fundamental right.’ With respect to such classifications, it is appropriate to
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See, Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1997)
(classifications reviewed under rational basis are presumptively valid unless
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where the government could not demonstrate some rational basis
for enacting the law. Nonetheless, in a number of cases, the Court
has actually applied a more searching inquiry, all the while
adhering to the term “rational basis.” Professor Gerald Gunther
referred to this level of review as rationality “with bite.”219 As
Gunther explained, the Court, even when unwilling to employ
strict or intermediate level scrutiny, has sometimes used rational
basis “plus” as an “interventionist tool” to strike laws that the
Court feels are unfair or unjust.220
To be more specific, all laws, of course, discriminate to some
extent.221
For example, speed limits discriminate against
individuals who like to drive at excessive speeds. The Equal
Protection Clause, however, is not concerned with such
discrimination but is instead designed to protect against
discrimination that is deemed invidious. Although the Court has
never specifically defined what is meant by “invidious,”222 the
term generally refers to “any systematic or purposeful deprivation,
marked by ill will, of identifiable segments of our population of
valuable goods and opportunities.”223 When confronted with
invidious discrimination, even when such discrimination is
targeted at groups not part of a suspect or quasi-suspect class, the
Court has nonetheless employed rational basis plus review to strike
down the governmental action at issue.
Furthermore, in applying this heightened version of rational
basis review, the Court, given the lack of any explicit test for
determining when state action equals invidious discrimination, has
frequently looked to the stigma that results from the state action as
a proxy for determining when such action violates the Fourteenth
Amendment. Indeed, as noted by Professor Peter Bayer, the Court
has routinely found government action to be irrational when that
219

Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term – Forward: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1972).
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See, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (noting that “most legislation
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See, Brenda Jones Quick, Ethical Rules Prohibiting Discrimination by
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NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 5, 38 (1993) (“The Supreme Court has
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action “is designed primarily to inflict harm or otherwise
disadvantage a politically weak group.”224
Thus, rational basis plus has some similarity to strict and
intermediate scrutiny in that, like these more searching forms of
inquiry, the question as to whether to apply rational basis plus
depends on who the governmental action is directed against as
well as the government’s motive. As one commentator noted,
“[f]or such groups that do not constitute suspect classes but
nevertheless resemble discrete and insular minorities, the Court
has applied a heightened form of rational basis review.”225 The
policy behind the Court’s concern is that it is the “politically
disenfranchised and socially marginalized [that] are more
vulnerable to the majoritarian tyranny against which equal
protection guards.”226 Some of the groups that the Court has found
to require such heightened protection, albeit not quite to the level
of intermediate or strict scrutiny, are the mentally disabled, illegal
aliens, and, most pointedly for this inquiry, homosexuals.
First, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the Court
struck down a Texas zoning ordinance that required proposed
group homes for the mentally retarded to obtain a special permit
that was not required for other group homes.227 In so ruling, the
Court essentially affirmed the earlier judgment of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals. However, the Court disagreed with the Fifth
Circuit’s ruling that governmental action directed at the mentally
retarded was subject to heightened scrutiny. 228 Although the
Court did explicitly point out the immutable nature of the mentally
retarded as well as the “undeniable differences between the
retarded and others” it nonetheless held that rational basis was the
correct level of scrutiny to be applied in this situation.229 Under a
more traditional application of rational basis scrutiny, the inquiry
would have ended there. It did not.
Instead, the Court noted that the “refusal to recognize the
retarded as a quasi-suspect class does not leave them entirely
224

Peter Brandon Bayer, A Plea for Rationality and Decency: The
Disparate Treatment of Legal Writing Faculties as a Violation of Both Equal
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Making Outcasts Out of Outlaws: The Unconstitutionality of Sex
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unprotected from invidious discrimination.”230 With that, the
Court went on to invalidate the zoning ordinance as an irrational
governmental action. Specifically, in analyzing the government’s
rationale for distinguishing between group homes for the mentally
retarded and all other group homes, the Court found that the
primary motivator for the distinction was “the negative attitude of
the majority of property owners located within 200 feet of the
[proposed facility], as well as the fears of elderly residents of the
neighborhood.”231 The Court unanimously agreed that it was
precisely this kind of discrimination against which the Equal
Protection Clause was designed to proscribe:
[M]ere negative attitudes, or fear unsubstantiated by
factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning
proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a
home for the mentally retarded differently from
apartment homes, multiple dwellings and the like . .
. . “Private biases may be outside the reach of the
law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give
them effect.”232
Next, in Plyler v. Doe, the Court struck down a state statute
that denied public education to the children of illegal
immigrants.233 As an initial matter, the court found that illegal
immigrants, similar to the mentally retarded in Cleburne, do not
constitute a suspect class.234 In so holding, the Court noted that
undocumented status is not an immutable characteristic given that
“it is the product of conscious, indeed, unlawful action.”235
Nonetheless, the Court found that the governmental action here
was not so much directed at illegal immigrants, but the children of
illegal immigrants. In that regard, those bearing the brunt of this
legislation were, in fact, an immutable group. Specifically, the
Court noted that the governmental action in this case was “directed
against children, and imposes its discriminatory burden on the
230

Id. at 446 (“The State may not rely on a classification whose relationship
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basis of a legal characteristic over which children can have little
control.”236
Nonetheless, even after drawing this distinction between illegal
immigrants and their children, the Court still applied rational basis
scrutiny.237 Even so, however, the Court ultimately struck down
the legislation given the stigma this legislation imposed on the
children at issue: “[The law at issue] imposes a lifetime hardship
on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling
status. The stigma of illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their
lives.”238 Furthermore, in so ruling, the Court was unwilling to
give automatic deference to any colorable basis that the state might
put forward to support the legislation. Instead, the Court noted the
need to engage in a balancing test: “In determining the rationality
of the [subject legislation], we may appropriately take into account
its costs to the Nation and to the innocent children who are its
victims.”239 Ultimately, the Court refused to recognize any of the
states’ proffered rationales as sufficient to override the extreme
harm inflicted on the children of illegal immigrants. Indeed, the
Court ultimately noted that “[i]t is difficult to understand precisely
what the State hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and
perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries.”240
Finally, the Court has also applied this more searching form of
rational basis to laws that adversely impact homosexuals.
Specifically, in Romer v. Evans, the Court struck down an
amendment to the Colorado Constitution which prevented
homosexuals from being included in any state anti-discrimination
laws.241 In describing the impact of this Amendment, the Court
noted: “Homosexuals, by state decree, are put in a solitary class
with respect to transactions and relations in both the private and
governmental spheres. The amendment withdraws from
homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the
injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of
236

Id.
Id. (“It is thus difficult to conceive of a rational justification for
penalizing these children for their presence within the United States.”).
238
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fundamental right”).
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Id. at 223-24.
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these laws and policies.”242
Unlike it did in Cleburne and Plyler, the Court declined to
explicitly state the level of scrutiny that attaches to laws that
adversely impact homosexuals. Instead, the Court noted that the
Colorado amendment “fails, indeed defies, even” rational basis
scrutiny.243 Specifically, the Court invalidated the Colorado
amendment on two grounds. First, the Court noted that the
amendment “imposes a special disability upon [homosexuals]
alone”244:
It is not within our constitutional tradition to
enact laws of this sort. Central both to the idea of
the rule of law and to our own Constitution’s
guarantee of equal protection is the principle that
government and each of its parts remain open on
impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.
“Equal protection of the laws is not achieved
through
indiscriminate
imposition
of
245
inequalities.”
Second, the Court ruled that the amendment also failed rational
basis review given that the amendment’s “sheer breadth is so
discontinuous with the reasons offered for that the amendment
seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it
affects.”246 As the Court explained:
Even laws enacted for broad and ambitious
purposes often can be explained by reference to
legitimate public policies which justify the
incidental disadvantages they impose on certain
persons. [Colorado’s amendment], however, in
making a general announcement that gays and
lesbians shall not have any particular protections
from the law, inflicts upon them immediate,
continuing, and real injures that outrun and belie
any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for
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it.247
Accordingly, the Court held that the Colorado amendment was
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause given that it “classifies
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make
them unequal to everyone else.”248
Of course, our understanding of the Equal Protection Clause as
it applies to homosexuals cannot rest entirely on Romer but must
also take into account the Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas,
which invalidated Texas’ anti-sodomy statute, which criminalized
homosexual but not heterosexual sodomy.249 Although the
majority in Lawrence based its decision on substantive due process
grounds, Lawrence nonetheless helps inform the equal protection
analysis that attaches to laws targeting homosexuals. In fact, when
discussing the Court’s decision in Romer, Justice Kennedy himself
noted when writing for the majority, “Equality of treatment and the
due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the
substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects
and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.”250 In
fact, one commentator has described Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion as seemingly using “rational basis on steroids for
analyzing a substantive due process claim.”251 In applying this
standard, the Court invalidated the state statute, as well as antisodomy statutes nationwide, on the basis that the “State cannot
demean [homosexuals’] existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime.”252
Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment but noted that she
would have decided the case using, not the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Equal Protection Clause.253
As Justice O’Connor pointed out, “Texas’ sodomy law brands all
homosexuals as criminals, thereby making it more difficult for
homosexuals to be treated in the same manner as everyone
else.”254 Given the stigmatizing impact this statute imposed on
homosexuals, Justice O’Connor, relying on Plyler v. Doe, saw no
247
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rational basis behind the legislation: “The Texas sodomy statute
subjects homosexuals to ‘a lifelong penalty and stigma. A
legislative classification that threatens the creation of an
underclass . . . cannot be reconciled with’ the Equal Protection
Clause.”255 In reaching this conclusion, O’Connor also relied on a
rather expansive view of Romer when she stated that “[m]oral
disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental
interest.”256 Furthermore, Justice O’Connor saw no saving grace in
the fact that Texas’ statute applied, not explicitly to homosexuals,
but to homosexual conduct:
While it is true that the law applies only to conduct,
the conduct targeted by this law is conduct that is
closely correlated with being homosexual. Under
such circumstances, Texas’ sodomy law is targeted
at more than conduct. It is instead directed toward
gay persons as a class. “After all, there can hardly
be more palpable discrimination against a class than
making the conduct that defines the class
criminal.”257
Although the majority, again, decided the case on the basis of
substantive due process and not equal protection grounds, the
majority nonetheless declared O’Connor’s approach to be “a
tenable argument.”258
Finally, both the majority opinion and O’Connor’s concurrence
relied in part on the fact that a violation of the Texas statute
resulting not only in a criminal conviction but had collateral
impacts such as disqualifying a convicted individual from entering
certain professions and also requiring that person to register as a
sex offender in both Texas as well as in other states, should a
convicted individual choose to relocate.259
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B. Discriminatory Romeo and Juliet Exceptions:
Invidious, Cruel and, thus, Unconstitutional
To understand why discriminatory Romeo and Juliet
exceptions to statutory rape laws are an invidious form of
discrimination, it is first important to note that all GLBT
adolescents “belong to at least two politically powerless groups,
children and homosexuals.” As a result, it seems quite evident that
the “more searching form of rational basis review” would certainly
apply to any state action directed at LGBT youth. Indeed, as noted
earlier, “the central justification for countermajoritarian
intervention by the courts to strike down discriminatory laws has
been the lack of political power on the part of the disadvantaged
minority.”260
Furthermore, as evidenced by Plyler and
Romer/Lawrence, the Court has already applied this level of
review to state actions directed at children and homosexuals,
respectively.261
However, LGBT teens are likely even more deserving of
rational basis plus given that LGBT teens are BOTH homosexual
and children. Thus, LGBT youth experience the political isolation
of children on top of the political isolation homosexuals, as a class,
already experience. Furthermore, as noted earlier, LGBT youth
are considered one of the most isolated and invisible minorities
within the United States.262 Indeed, whereas most youth enjoy the
benefit of having the support of those who are not politically
powerless, like parents and educators, LGBT children often lack
those support systems. Likewise, unlike LGBT adults who may
vote and theoretically effectuate change through the election
process, LGBT youth lack any such access to the democratic
process.
Because of this greater level of political isolation, one could
certainly argue that laws directed at LGBT youth deserve a higher
level of scrutiny beyond even rational basis plus. However, it is
the position of this Article, that a Court would need not reach this
issue given that “rationality with bite,” as the Supreme Court has
defined and applied the term, is more than sufficient to invalidate
laws, like the Romeo and Juliet exceptions identified earlier, which
discriminate between homosexual and heterosexual youth.
Specifically, what one can seemingly glean from Cleyburne,
260
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Plyler and Romer/Lawrence, is that the government is
constitutionally prohibited from attempting to “make members of a
particular group second-class citizens even when that group is not
considered a suspect classification”263 if the benefits of the
governmental action are outweighed by the harm inflicted on the
affected group. Although this approach was most explicitly put
forth in Plyer when the Court stated that “[i]n determining the
rationality of the [subject legislation], we may appropriately take
into account its costs to the Nation and to the innocent children
who are its victims,”264 as explained above, the Court nonetheless
followed this same principle in both Cleyburne and Romer as it
weighed the government’s purported interest against the resulting
stigmatic harm on the targeted groups.265
Thus, with this understanding that discriminatory Romeo and
Juliet exceptions would most likely be subject to a higher level of
rational basis review, it then becomes necessary to first look at the
states’ expected justifications for drawing distinctions between
homosexual and heterosexual teenage activity and then compare
that to the harm these laws inflict upon LGBT youth.
1. State Justifications for Criminalizing LGBT Sexuality
Interestingly, the legislative histories behind discriminatory
Romeo and Juliet exceptions fail to shed light on why the
legislatures in those states thought sexual acts between adolescents
of the same sex warranted harsher penalties than similar acts
between adolescents of the opposite sex.266 However, these
omissions are not surprising given that legislatures are rarely
explicit when enacting legislation that discriminates against an
unpopular group.267 Fortunately for our purposes, however, the
Supreme Court of Kansas has already struck down its state’s
discriminatory Romeo and Juliet provision on equal protection
263
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grounds and, through that litigation, the state was forced to “show
its cards” and, thus, delineate its reasons for discriminating
between homosexual and heterosexual adolescents.268 However,
before moving on to Kansas’ purported justifications for such a
statute, some background on the case is necessary.
In State v. Limon, Matthew Limon had been 18 years-old for
one week when he engaged in consensual oral sex with M.A.R.,
who turned 15 in the month following the encounter.269 In Kansas,
the Romeo and Juliet statute allowed for a much reduced penalty
for violating the statutory rape laws provided that (1) the victim
was 14 or 15 years of age; (2) the defendant was both less than 19
years of age and less than four years older than the victim; (3) the
victim and the defendant are the only ones involved in the sexual
act; and (4) the victim and the defendant are of the opposite sex.270
Had Matthew Limon been convicted under the Romeo and Juliet
statute, his sentence would have been no greater than fifteen
months and he would not have been required to register as a
convicted sex offender.271 However, Limon did not qualify for the
Romeo and Juliet statute solely because he and M.A.R. were both
male. Accordingly, Limon was convicted and sentenced to over
seventeen years (206 months) in prison, followed by five years of
post-release supervision, and was required to register as a
persistent sexual offender.272
After being convicted and sentenced, Limon appealed to the
Kansas Court of Appeals. However, in its 2002 opinion,273 the
court affirmed the conviction relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.274 When the Kansas Supreme
Court refused to grant Limon’s petition for review, Limon filed a
petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.275 The
day after it issued Lawrence v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted Limon’s petition, vacated the judgment of the Kansas
Court of Appeals, and remanded the case to the state appellate
court for reconsideration in light of Lawrence.276 In a “fractured”
opinion, the Kansas Court of Appeals again affirmed Limon’s
268
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conviction and sentence, distinguishing Lawrence on the grounds
that the latter involved the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and not the Equal Protection Clause, which is what
formed the basis of Limon’s challenge.277 Once again, Limon
filed a petition for review with the Kansas Supreme Court, and this
time, the petition was granted.
The Kansas Supreme Court, in striking down the part of the
statute that required that the defendant and the victim be of the
opposite sex, gave thoughtful consideration to all the potential
justifications for the requirement, paying attention to not only
those arguments that the state had put forth but also the potential
state rationales that had been posited by the Kansas Court of
Appeals.278 The list of plausible state interests was as follows:
(1) the protection and preservation of the traditional
sexual mores of society; (2) preservation of the
historical
notions
of
appropriate
sexual
development of children; (3) protection of teenagers
against coercive relationships; (4) protection of
teenagers from the increased health risks that
accompany sexual activity; [and] (5) promotion of
parental responsibility and procreation.279
As the Kansas Supreme Court correctly found, the first
potential justification, i.e., sexual morality, is also the easiest to
reject. Indeed, as Justice O’Connor made clear in her concurrence
in Lawrence, “[m]oral disapproval of a group cannot be a
legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause
because legal classifications must not be ‘drawn for the purpose of
disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.’”280 Furthermore,
this same principle can be found in the majority opinion in
Lawrence where the Court discussed its rationale for overruling
Bowers v. Hardwick:
[T]he Court in Bowers were making the broader
point that for centuries there have been powerful
277
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voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral.
The condemnation has been shaped by religious
beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable
behavior, and respect for the traditional family. For
many persons these are not trivial concerns but
profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical
and moral principles to which they aspire and which
thus determine the course of their lives. . . . These
considerations do not answer the question before
us.281
Accordingly, to the extent that concerns over sexual morality
might motivate states to discriminate between 1) sexual activity
involving same sex partners and that involving opposite sex
partners and/or 2) between sexual intercourse and sodomy, such
concerns are illegitimate justifications.
Second, any concern the state has in preserving “the sexual
development of children” also fails as a justification for
discriminatory Romeo and Juliet provisions. Specifically, as noted
earlier, there are numerous studies indicating that sexual
orientation is acquired long before adolescence and that sexual
experiences during adolescence are quite independent of a
person’s ultimate sexual orientation.282 In fact, it was because of
such research that the Kansas Supreme Court rejected this
purported state interest:283 “We conclude, as the United States
Supreme Court stated in Romer, the ‘status-based enactment [is so]
divorced from any factual context’ we cannot ‘discern a
relationship’ to the espoused State interest that the law preserves
the sexual development of children consistent with traditional
sexual mores.”284
Third, in addressing the states’ purported concern with “the
coercive effect often existing in a relationship between adult and
child,” the Kansas Supreme Court found that such a rationale
would undermine the whole point behind the Romeo and Juliet
exception:
281
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The legislature determined, at least as to those in a
heterosexual relationship, that a mutual relationship
between teenagers is less likely to involve the same
coercion than a relationship between an older adult and
a child might and is more likely to be one where the
minor’s participation is voluntary, although not legally
consensual.285
In light of that motivating policy, the Kansas Supreme Court found
no rational basis to distinguish between a class of those 18 years
old and younger who engage in voluntary, heterosexual activity
with minors aged 14 or 15 and a class of those 18 years old and
younger who engage in voluntary, homosexual activity with such
minors.286 “We see no basis to determine that as a class one group
or the other would have a higher tendency to be coercive. A
distinction on that basis has no factual support.”287
Fourth, the Kansas Supreme Court found that the state’s
purported concern for public health was “so broad and so divorced
from supporting facts that we cannot discern a relationship to the
facially legitimate interest of protecting public health.”288
Specifically, in putting forth this potential state interest, the state
appeared to be talking about its concern over the spread of HIV. 289
However, the Kansas court made a number of findings that
undermined this purported rationale. First, the court noted that,
among adolescent females, the biggest risk for sexual transmission
of HIV is through heterosexual, not homosexual, sex.290 Second,
an adolescent involved in oral sex, i.e., the activity that resulted in
Limon’s arrest, has a “near-zero chance of acquiring the HIV
infection.”291 Finally, the Kansas court cited to one of the
dissenting judges from the Kansas Court of Appeals whose dissent
demonstrated the faulty logic behind a “public health”
justification:
[U]nder the law a female infected with every
285

Id. at 36.
Id.
287
Id.
288
Id. at 37.
289
Id. at 36.
290
Id. at 37 (relying on statistics from the United States Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention).
291
Id.
286

2/23/2008

Queer Teens and Legislative Bullies

venereal disease yet identified, and engaging in acts
quite likely to infect or actually infecting a male
minor, will receive a much lighter sentence. A
disease-free male engaging in sex with another male
in a manner not likely to spread disease if present
will receive a much heavier sentence. Perversely,
under the law, a male with venereal disease who
infects and impregnates an underage female will
also receive a much lighter sentence.292
As a result, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the “statute’s
superficial earmarks as a health measure” fail the rational basis
test.293
Finally, the Kansas court addressed what the Kansas Court of
Appeals had proposed as a potential justification for the
discriminatory statute: “[T]he legislature might have determined
that lengthy incarceration of a young adult offender who has
become a parent as a result of a heterosexual relationship with a
minor would be counterproductive to that young adult’s duty to
support his or her child.”294 However, such a concern would not
apply to homosexual pairings as such activity cannot result in
pregnancy. The Kansas Supreme Court, however, quickly rejected
this purported justification given that 1) the state has an interest in
discouraging teenage pregnancy, not encouraging it and 2) “the
statute does not reduce penalties solely for conduct that results in
pregnancy, but also for heterosexual conduct which does not result
in pregnancy.”295
Accordingly, the Kansas Supreme Court failed to find any
legitimate justifications behind the state’s action. Although
Kansas is the only state in which a discriminatory Romeo and
Juliet provision has been litigated, it can be presumed that other
states would put forth similar justifications and, thus, State v.
Limon is a helpful case for understanding those potential
arguments and their inherent weaknesses.
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2. Stigmatic Harm to LGBT Youth
In employing rational basis plus scrutiny, the Supreme Court
has made clear that any weight given to the state’s purported
justifications will be diminished by the corresponding harm to the
target group. Despite the thorough job that the Supreme Court of
Kansas did in fleshing out all the potential colorable state interests
underlying the state;s discriminatory Romeo and Juliet provision,
what the court failed to do was fully consider the stigmatic impact
such laws have on LGBT adolescents.
Given that it is the potential for the harm to the targeted group
that underlies the more searching form of rational basis, it is
important to fully understand just how harmful these laws are to
GLBT adolescents. Furthermore, to the extent those states that
continue to adhere to discriminatory Romeo and Juliet provisions
may have additional justifications outside of those identified in
Limon, understanding the level of harm caused by those statutes
will guide future courts which are called upon to evaluate those
justifications. Indeed, as the Supreme Court has made clear, any
purported state interest must be balanced against the resulting
harm.
As an initial matter, it is important to understand that these
discriminatory Romeo and Juliet provisions, just like their nowextinct relatives, adult anti-sodomy statutes, are extremely
stigmatizing to homosexual adolescents regardless of whether the
statutes are even enforced.
As one commentator noted,
“unenforced sodomy laws are the chief symptomatic way that
society as a whole tells gays they are scum.”296 As Professor
Christopher R. Leslie described when writing about the injuries
that are caused by unenforced sodomy laws:
Sodomy laws are kept on the books, even
though state governments do not intend to actively
enforce them, because the laws send a message to
society that homosexuality is unacceptable. Even
without actual criminal prosecution, the laws carry
meaning. Statutes have significance completely
independent of their actual enforcement. Law
reflects society and informs it. Current generations
enshrine morality by passing laws and perpetuate
296
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their prejudices by handing these laws down to their
children. Soon, statutes take on lives of their own,
and their very existence justifies their premises and
consequent implications. . . . In short, the primary
importance of sodomy laws today is the
government’s message to diminish the societal
status of gay men and lesbians.297
In short, Professor Leslie concludes that “[s]tates maintain sodomy
laws to pin a badge of criminality on every gay man and lesbian,
whether or not he or she lives in a state with a sodomy statute.”298
Although the sodomy statutes to which Professor Leslie
referred are now extinct thanks to Lawrence v. Texas, these same
arguments exist as to those states that maintain discriminatory
Romeo and Juliet provisions. Specifically, in those states, LGBT
adolescents are told it is a felony to engage in sexual acts with
someone of the same gender who is below the age of consent yet it
no offense whatsoever (or, in California, merely a misdemeanor),
to do the exact same thing with someone of the opposite sex.299
Furthermore, these consequences flow not only to those who
may violate those laws but the entire LGBT adolescent
community. Indeed, the stigma that results from a state’s law will
rarely be contained within that jurisdiction. Thus, even if only one
state maintained a discriminatory Romeo and Juliet law, LGBT
teens nationwide are likely to suffer the resulting harm. The
Court’s decision in Lawrence is instructive here. Specifically, in
the majority opinion, the Court noted that, even though Bowers did
not require the criminalization of sodomy, nonetheless, “its
297
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continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual
persons.”300
In many ways, however, discriminatory Romeo and Juliet laws
are even more damaging than the sodomy laws that pertained to
consensual adult activity. First off, these laws are directed not at
LGBT adults, most of whom would now be accepting of their
homosexuality, but are targeted at LGBT adolescents, who are
generally less secure in their sexual identity.301 Thus, given that,
for most LGBT teens, adolescence is a time of severe conflict and
self-doubt,302 laws that criminalize sex between two teens of the
same gender but not sex between two teens of the opposite gender,
can only exacerbate the psychological problems already
experienced by a number of LGBT adolescents.303 Second, the
existence of such statutes may also, in fact, increase the incidence
of violence targeted at LGBT youth. Finally, those adolescents
convicted under these discriminatory statutes will continue to face
stigma throughout their lives in a number of contexts given the
collateral consequences that arise from being convicted as a
statutory rapist.
a. Psychological Harm
In describing how sodomy laws, even when unenforced,
inhibited sound emotional and mental development among
homosexuals, Professor Leslie identified three ways, all of which
apply with equal force to discriminatory Romeo and Juliet laws.
First, there is the threat of fueling internalized homophobia,
including “denial of membership in the group, self-derision, selfhatred, hatred of others in the group and acting out self-fulfilling
prophesies about one’s own inferiority.”304 As indicated earlier,
internalized homophobia and feelings of isolation are fairly
common among LGBT youth and it is these feelings that are often
to blame for many of the tragic endings that befall these
adolescents.305 Thus, discriminatory Romeo and Juliet provisions,
are only likely to increase the incidence of such harm. This is
because, given that the state now cannot apply such laws to adult
300
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homosexuals, LGBT adolescents, many of whom are already
extremely isolated in their home and school environments,306 are
then also isolated from the one group in which they might find
some degree of kinship and support – the adult LGBT community.
Second, given that sexual experimentation is a normal part of
human development, laws targeting adolescent sexual activity
“would interfere with healthy mental and emotional
development.”307 As the American Psychological Association and
the American Public Health Association argued in Bowers v.
Hardwick, “research indicates that the freedom to engage in such
conduct is important to the psychological health of individuals and
of their most intimate and profound relationships.”308 Of course, if
taken to an extreme, this rationale could be used to make the
argument that states should never be allowed to criminalize sexual
activity between adolescents, even if one is below the age of
consent. However, the point here is merely that those states that
continue to adhere to discriminatory Romeo and Juliet provisions
are effectively permitting heterosexual teens to obtain the
developmental and psychological benefit that is associated with
sexual expression yet, at the same time, are denying LGBT teens
the same opportunity. Professor Leslie’s words, although in
reference to state sodomy laws, are equally appropriate here: “In
sum, prohibiting sexual expression thwarts proper mental and
emotional development because the driving force behind sodomy
laws is that ‘they enlist and redirect physical and emotional desires
that we do not expect people to suppress.”309
Finally, many health experts believe that the existence of these
laws could discourage someone in need from seeking psychiatric
help. In other words, a sexually-active LGBT adolescent may be
discouraged from seeking counseling for psychological problems
for fear of exposing himself or a sexual partner to criminal
liability.310 Such potentiality is not to be taken lightly given, again,
the high susceptibility that LGBT adolescents have to
psychological disorders and the tragic consequences that those
306
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disorders may produce.311 Instead, states should be doing all they
can to make it more likely that LGBT adolescents in need are
willing and able to seek out assistance.
b. Increased Risk of Violence
As noted earlier, LGBT adolescents are routinely the victims
of verbal and physical assaults.312 However, as one commentator
has noted “the criminalization of homosexual sodomy and crimes
of homophobic violence mutually reinforce one another.”313
Additionally, even non-criminal laws directed at homosexuals may
translate into an increase in violence towards homosexuals. For
example, after Colorado passed Amendment Two, i.e., the
amendment struck down in Romer, reports of violence in Colorado
against gays and lesbians tripled.314
In fact, some commentators have noted that “gay bashers” may
even use the existence of such laws as justification for their acts of
violence. As Professor Kendall Thomas notes, “homosexual
sodomy statutes express the official ‘theory’ of homophobia;
private acts of violence against gay men and lesbians ‘translate’
that theory into brutal ‘practice.’
In other words, private
homophobic violence punishes what homosexual sodomy statutes
prohibit.”315 Professor Leslie finds support for Professor Thomas’
theory in that “[m]any law enforcement officials appear less than
eager to prosecute acts of anti-gay violence.”316
Thus, states that continue to perpetuate discriminatory Romeo
and Juliet exceptions could, in effect, only enhance the risk of antigay violence that LGBT teens already face. Furthermore, given
the attention that the national media typically devotes to statutory
311
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rape cases,317 enforcement of these laws can result in increased
violence not just against LGBT adolescents in the states that have
these laws, but against LGBT teens nationwide.
c. Collateral Consequences of Conviction
As noted earlier, both the violence and the psychological
consequences of criminal laws targeting LGBT adolescents may
easily occur regardless of whether those laws are ever even
enforced. 318 Furthermore, these consequences flow not only to
those who may violate those laws but the entire LGBT adolescent
community nationwide. However, for those adolescents who are
convicted under discriminatory statutory rape laws, they face a
whole host of additional penalties beyond just the
disproportionately greater criminal sentence that accompanies
these crimes. Indeed, these adolescents are exposed to a number
of stigmatic harms that are likely to follow them throughout the
remainder of their lives. Just as the Supreme Court noted in
Lawrence, “[t]he stigma this criminal statute imposes, moreover, is
not trivial.”319
One of the most obvious collateral consequences that befalls
those adolescents convicted for statutory rape (and who fail to
qualify for the Romeo and Juliet exception given the gender of
their “victim”) is the fact that those individuals are required to
register as convicted sex offenders with all the resulting penalties
that registration brings.320 A number of commentators have
criticized state statutes that require registration as a sex
offender.321 Although those arguments need not be repeated here
in their entirety, there are a couple of issues germane to LGBT
adolescents that do bear some emphasis.
First, these discriminatory Romeo and Juliet provisions should
317
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immediately inspire caution given that they require individuals
who are not even adults to register as a sex offender. This
punishment is a particularly cruel punishment to impose on
juveniles given that, because of their youth, they may be less
equipped to deal with the public disclosure that automatically
accompanies sex offender registration.322 For LGBT adolescents,
this concern is particularly acute given that, as noted earlier, it is
those adolescents who are least likely to reveal their sexual
orientation to others that are the most likely to attempt suicide.323
Second, the requirement that the convicted teen register as a
sex offender goes well-beyond the state where the “crime” was
convicted. Indeed, a LGBT teen convicted of statutory rape in
Texas, Alabama or California would not only have to register as a
sex offender in her respective state but also in a number of other
states simply by virtue of the conviction in the original state.324 Of
course, adolescents who commit statutory rape but qualify for their
state’s Romeo and Juliet exception are spared this indignity.
Again, however, when the sexual act was with someone of the
same gender, Texas, Alabama and California are not so kind.
Aside from being required to register as sex offenders, those
LGBT teens who are convicted under a discriminatory statutory
rape law face a number of other legal consequences as a direct
result of their conviction. For example, Professor Diana Hassel
has looked at how violations of state sodomy laws can
subsequently come back to haunt defendants in several types of
civil litigation, including family law, employment discrimination
and immigration law:
A gay father who could provide a financially and
emotionally stable home for his son was denied
custody because he was determined to be violating
state sodomy laws. The child was instead placed
with his mother and stepfather in spite of the fact
that the stepfather had been convicted of assault and
charged with domestic abuse. An accomplished
322
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attorney’s offer of employment from the state
attorney general’s office was revoked because she
was a lesbian and therefore could be presumed to
have violated state sodomy laws. A gay immigrant
was denied citizenship because his violation of
sodomy laws made him morally unfit.325
Although these examples relate to either actual or presumed
violations of state sodomy laws, statutory rape convictions for
LGBT adolescents would carry similar consequences. For
example, a felony conviction would disqualify a LGBT adolescent,
just like other felons, from pursuing certain kinds of employment.
Justice O’Connor in Lawrence discovered a similar problem when
analyzing Texas’ sodomy statute: “It appears that petitioners’
convictions, if upheld, would disqualify them from or restrict their
ability to engage in a variety of professions.”326 Furthermore, a
conviction for statutory rape qualifies as a crime of moral
turpitude, which can subject a non-U.S. citizen, whether here
illegally or legally, to deportation.
Thus, in those states with discriminatory Romeo and Juliet
provisions, an older adolescent who commits a sex act with
someone who is close in age yet below the age of consent, will be
guilty of no crime or, in California, of merely a misdemeanor so
long as the two teens are of opposite genders.327 However, if the
two happen to be of the same gender, then the older adolescent is
guilty of a felony, will have to serve between 2 and 20 years in
prison, and must register as a convicted sex offender, with the
attendant penalties associated with registration.328
Furthermore, regardless of how gender neutral these states may
attempt to write these discriminatory provisions, it is clear that
those most adversely affected such statutes are LGBT adolescents,
which are one of the most powerless and stigmatized groups in the
country. As noted at the beginning of this Article, the U.S.
Department of Health has described gay and lesbian youth as “the
most invisible and outcast group of young people with whom you
will come into contact.”329
Accordingly, given the fact that there seemingly exists no
325
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legitimate justification for the particular classification these states
are making and the disparate penalties accompanying that
classification, it becomes clear that discriminatory Romeo and
Juliet exceptions are premised solely on “a classification of
persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal
Protection Clause does not permit.”330
V. CONCLUSION: WHAT STATES SHOULD BE DOING
This Article takes no position on whether and to what extent a
state can criminalize sex involving a minor. However, in making
those decisions, what the state cannot do is draw distinctions based
on sexual orientation. To give heterosexual adolescents a free or a
much-reduced pass under the state’s statutory rape law yet, at the
same time, insist on full-fare for a similarly situated homosexual
adolescent violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment given the strained relationship this discrimination
bears to the purported justifications. Furthermore, what makes
these laws even more egregious is the extent to which they impose
enormous stigma on a group that is already extremely
marginalized in American society.
Although most LGBT teens are well accustomed to being
teased, harassed, and abused, that is no justification for the state
legislature to dole out its own form of bullying behavior. Quite the
opposite, states should be looking for ways to help minimize the
extreme cruelty and alienation experienced by some of its most
helpless citizens. At the very least, states like Texas, Alabama and
California should remove statutory distinctions based on
homosexual versus heterosexual activity from their statutory rape
laws. As demonstrated above, such classifications are not only
unconstitutional but are also unpardonably cruel in light of the
extreme societal stigma that LGBT youth already face.
By repealing these laws and not just waiting for a court to
ultimately strike them down, these states would be sending a
message to LGBT adolescents that 1) their existence is recognized;
2) whatever other sources of stress and alienation they currently
experience, the state has no wish to provide an additional form of
stigma; and 3) the state does not approve of LGBT adolescents
being treated any differently than other adolescents. Considering
the high level of invisibility and alienation felt by LGBT
330
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adolescents, such a message would be, no doubt, a welcome
reduction in the amount of societal stigma currently directed at this
fragile minority group.
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